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Abstract 
  Patients with Dissociative Identity Disorder (DID) pose ethical challenges for 
clinicians regarding capacity for medical decisions. If such a patient possesses various 
personality states with potentially different values, opinions, and preferences, this can 
lead to conflicting choices regarding medical treatments. Yet, only one decision can be 
carried out, which might lead some clinicians to believe that DID patients cannot possess 
capacity. In this thesis, I argue against this presumption by demonstrating that there are 
clinical contexts and situations where, ethically, patients with DID should (and, in some 
cases, should not) possess capacity. To accomplish this, a patient-centered approach to 
determining capacity for DID patients is introduced. Such an approach is rooted in the 
attributes of patient-centered care and the current bioethical consensus that psychiatric 
patients should not be deemed to lack capacity for treatment decisions solely due to their 
diagnosis. It also implores clinicians to consider the degree of value-sharing and 
awareness among a patients' personality states, as well as the decision at hand and the 
level of risk associated with the decision when making determinations of capacity for 
DID patients. 
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 Introduction   
  If you were to look at me, you'd see a single person, a female  
  in her early forties; but when we look in the mirror we see us,  
  fragmented identities living within one body.  . . .[W]e are  
  twenty six alters each with our own distinct personality.  . . . 
  [W]e have grown from the original six Carol knew of when she  
  was initially diagnosed in 2008. Such is the reality of life with   
  [dissociative identity disorder].
1
   
  
This excerpt was written by "Caitlyn," one of twenty-six different identities residing 
within the mind of Carol Broad.
2
 As she states, Carol suffers from dissociative identity 
disorder (DID), a psychological disorder primarily characterized by " . . . the presence of 
two or more distinct personality states."
3
  
 Imagine now that Carol is diagnosed with a glioblastoma and the likelihood of 
survival, even with therapy or surgical intervention, is slim. "Caitlyn" appreciates the fact 
that Carol has limited time left and she does not want to live out her remaining days in 
hospital attempting treatment that would probably be futile. Therefore, Caitlyn chooses 
not to undergo any medical treatment because she wants to spend time with loved ones 
and doing activities she enjoys instead. However, another of Carol's personalities is not 
willing to accept death and, as a result, wants to try and combat the tumor with aggressive 
therapy. Therefore, this personality is adamant that medical intervention occur in order to 
prolong Carol's life as much as possible.  
 Given that Carol's personalities are in disagreement with one another on a major 
medical decision, such a scenario raises an intriguing dilemma. Both personalities inhabit 
                                                             
1 Carol Broad, "Living with DID," in Living with the Reality of Dissociative Identity Disorder: 
Campaigning Voices ed. Xenia Bowlby and Deborah Briggs (London: Karnac Books Ltd., 2014), 67. 
2 Broad, "Living with DID," 67. 
3 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders," 5th ed., 
Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Association (2013). Retrieved from https://dsm-psychiatryonline-
org.qe2a-proxy.mun.ca/doi/full/10.1176/appi.books.9780890425596.dsm08. 
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the mind of Carol and both seem to be putting forth viewpoints that are valid and in 
accordance with their expressed beliefs and preferences. However, only one decision can 
be carried out by Carol's physician or care team. Therefore, what is the appropriate course 
of action in such a case? Should Carol be deemed capable of making this medical 
decision? 
  Let us consider another case. A well-known example of DID is Christine "Chris" 
Costner Sizemore (born Christine Costner).
4
 Chris suffered from severe childhood trauma 
after witnessing several horrifying events, such as seeing her mother being bloodily 
injured.
5
 She was also physically abused repeatedly while growing up, and she later 
entered into a relationship with a man who constantly beat her.
6
 As a result of her trauma, 
Chris dissociated into multiple personality states as a means of coping with, and escaping 
from, her pain and suffering.
7
 Severe trauma is the most common trigger of dissociation.
8
 
At one point, Chris possessed three distinct, contrasting personalities: "Eve White" (a 
"demure and depressed" woman who preferred to remain at home), "Eve Black" (a "self-
indulgent party girl"), and "Jane" (a woman characterized as "pleasant and  
sensible").
9
 
                                                             
4 Bruce Weber, "Chris Costner Sizemore, Patient Behind 'The Three Faces of Eve,' Dies at 89," The New 
York Times, August 5, 2016. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/06/us/chris-costner-sizemore-the-real-
patient-behind-the-three-faces-of-eve-dies-at-89.html.  
5 Weber, "Chris Costner Sizemore." 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Frank W. Putnam,  Diagnosis and Treatment of Multiple Personality Disorder, (New York: The 
Guildford Press, 1989), 47. 
9 Weber, "Chris Costner Sizemore;" Adam Bernstein, "Chris Sizemore, Whose Many Personalities were the 
Real Faces of Eve, Dies at 89," The Washington Post, July 29, 2016. 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/chris-sizemore-whose-multiple-personality-
disorder-was-filmed-as-the-three-faces-of-eve-dies-at-89/2016/07/29/3ed468e2-55b4-11e6-bbf5-
957ad17b4385_story.html?utm_term=.2641d2c9ec16. 
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 The case of Chris Costner highlights the notion that the different personality states 
of an individual with DID often exist within contrasting psychological states. Considering 
the above descriptions of Eve White and Jane, for instance, it is implied that Jane does 
not display signs of psychiatric pathology as compared to Eve White (who displays signs 
of clinical depression). What is also apparent from this case is that the personality states 
of an individual with DID can express different preferences and values. As an example, 
comparing Eve White to Eve Black, it can be inferred that Eve Black values socializing 
and being active, whereas Eve White prefers to be alone and not interact with others. 
 Taking these observations into account, hypothetically, if Eve White, Eve Black, 
and Jane were all presented with a particular medical treatment decision, it would be 
possible for them to make differing choices. For example, if Chris required treatment for 
a thyroid nodule and was presented with the options of either an anti-thyroid medication 
or surgery (a more invasive option),
10
 Eve Black may choose the medication option, since 
surgery would require a recovery period whereas the medication would allow her to 
continue her lifestyle. However, based on their characteristics, it is not as clear what 
choice Eve White or Jane would make, so it cannot be assumed that they would agree 
with Eve Black and consent to the surgery. Moreover, in cases of DID such as Chris 
Costner's (whereby the personality states have differing psychological states or 
symptoms), it could be theoretically possible for the decision-making capabilities of the 
individual personalities to vary in addition to their choices. 
                                                             
10 Mayo Clinic, "Thyroid Nodules," 2019. Retrieved from  https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/thyroid-nodules/diagnosis-treatment/drc-20355266 
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 Why would the above situations be ethically problematic for health care 
professionals? First, a patient with DID only has one body; therefore, a treatment decision 
that is accepted and implemented by a physician or care team would directly impact all of 
the patient's personality states, regardless of their expressed values and whether or not 
they agree with the decision. Second, if there is more than one personality that appears to 
be decisionally capable, accepting the decision of one personality as authoritative could 
unethically undermine the capably expressed wishes of the other personalities and, 
possibly, their autonomy (if one considers a DID patient's personality states to be 
autonomous agents). Finally, DID patients are often psychologically traumatized 
individuals (as seen with Chris Costner). Therefore, automatically deeming them 
incapable of making their own treatment decisions because of conflicting personalities 
could cause significant distress, distrust in health care professionals, and even worsen 
their condition. As a result, a series of questions is raised: how should health care 
professionals reconcile various personality states when presented with a patient with 
DID? Are personality states autonomous agents? Do all personality states have decision-
making capacity? For which medical decisions should a DID patient possess capacity? 
What approach to determining a DID patient's capacity ensures that the patient's 
autonomy is maintained when possible? 
 This thesis will attempt to answer these questions through introducing and 
outlining ethical considerations and guidance on determining the medical decision-
making capacity of patients with DID. My aim is to introduce a patient-centered approach 
to determining such capacity by debunking the presumption that DID patients simply 
cannot possess capacity due to their psychiatric condition, as well as demonstrating that 
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there are situations and contexts where, ethically, DID patients should and should not 
possess capacity. This requires a multi-step framework and analysis. Thus, in Chapter 
One, I will present and discuss the clinical attributes of dissociative identity disorder, 
including the symptoms of DID and how clinicians assess the severity of dissociation and 
DID. As well, the concept of decision-making capacity (specifically within the context of 
medical treatment decisions) will be outlined in detail. Possessing capacity for such 
decisions would require the following abilities: understanding the necessary information 
regarding the treatment, appreciating the outcomes of the decision on one's life, reasoning 
about a treatment decision through weighing benefits and risks, outwardly 
communicating a decisional choice, and possessing a coherent, stable set of values. 
Finally, I will also discuss how allowing patients with capacity the freedom to make their 
own decisions supports their autonomy and welfare.  
 Determining capacity for DID patients requires an in-depth examination of the 
nature of personality states, and in Chapter Two, I will outline two competing viewpoints 
in the literature regarding personality states: the multiple person thesis (personality states 
are distinct persons) and the single person thesis (personality states are not individual 
persons, but rather altered psychological states of the subject with DID). In this chapter, I 
will argue that the single person thesis offers a more plausible interpretation of 
personality states. To accomplish this, I will demonstrate that a subject with DID is a 
singular entity through discussion of trait overlap between personality states and the 
possibility of shared phenomenological and conscious awareness among alter 
personalities. I will also argue that alter personalities are not autonomous agents, and that 
a DID subject is a single agent who possesses self-governance that does not rest with 
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their alter personalities. This will be shown  through discussion of dissociation and the 
therapeutic process of integrating personality states. 
 Regarding an individual with DID as a singular locus of agency, in Chapter Three, 
I will argue that the presence of alter personalities can, in some circumstances, impede a 
patient with DID from executing their agency as an individual that is autonomously 
capable of their own medical decision-making. I will analyze how each of the 
requirements and abilities necessary for decision-making capacity presented in Chapter 
One could be hampered in a patient with DID. As well, I will demonstrate that DID can 
diminish the moral agency and responsibility of patients with the disorder. It is important 
to clarify that, in this chapter, I am not suggesting that patients with DID do not possess 
capacity at all, as capacity is context- and decision-specific. Rather, these hindrances 
force one to consider which treatment decisions DID patients could and could not 
possibly make. 
 Such a consideration will be explored in Chapter Four, as I will present and 
discuss an ethically-sound approach for determining the decision making capacity of a 
patient with DID, as well as my recommendations for which treatment decisions DID 
patients should be allowed to make. This approach takes into account the aforementioned 
ethical challenges posed by DID and attempts to preserve the autonomy of the patient 
when possible. I will demonstrate that the following considerations are necessary when 
determining whether a DID patient has capacity for a particular treatment decision: the 
degree of awareness between the patient's alter personalities, whether or not there is a 
designated main personality, the decision itself, and whether the decision at hand is in 
regards to the patient's psychiatric therapy or a non-psychiatric medical issue. 
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Chapter 1: Dissociative Identity Disorder and Decision-Making Capacity 
 Imagine an elderly female patient afflicted with Alzheimer's disease who is 
becoming increasingly forgetful and suffers from memory loss.
11
 She visits her physician 
to undergo a pre-operative evaluation for a full hip replacement surgery.
12
 As part of the 
evaluation, the physician informs her about the risks of the surgery, as well as other 
potential treatment options, and asks her if she understands what they have just told her.
13
 
The patient does not appear to understand what is being communicated to her as she 
continuously smiles and repeats the phrase "It'll be okay."
14
 The patient's unusual 
response and apparent lack of understanding causes the physician to wonder if the patient 
possesses the capacity to decide whether or not to proceed with the surgery.
15
 
 Clinical situations similar to the one above occur frequently in medical practice, 
as clinicians are often presented with patients whose capacity to make decisions 
concerning medical treatment is questionable.
16
 As suggested in the aforementioned 
example, the patient's memory loss due to Alzheimer's disease is hindering her ability to 
comprehend and process the information being communicated to her. Such cognitive 
impairment affects a patient's capacity to make decisions
17
 (hereafter referred to as 
decision-making capacity, or capacity). However, psychological disorders and symptoms 
                                                             
11 Laura L. Sessums, Hanna Zembrzuska, and Jeffery L. Jackson, "Does this Patient Have Medical 
Decision-Making Capacity?," Journal of the American Medical Association 306, no. 4 (2011), 420. 
12 Sessums et al., "Does this Patient," 420. 
13 Ibid., 420. 
14 Ibid., 420. 
15 Ibid., 420. 
16 Thomas Grisso and Paul S. Appelbaum, "Comparison of Standards for Assessing Patient's Capacities to 
Make Treatment Decisions," The American Journal of Psychiatry 152, no. 7 (1995), 1033. 
17 Laura Dunn, Milap A. Nowrangi, Barton W. Palmer, Dilip V. Jeste, and Elyn R. Saks, "Assessing 
Decisional Capacity for Clinical Research or Treatment: A Review of Instruments," The American Journal 
of Psychiatry 163, no. 8 (2006), 1323.  
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may also affect a patient's decision-making capacity.
18
 Assessing capacity with regards to 
treatment decisions is integral to the care of patients with psychological disorders, as the 
presence of such a disorder can alter a patient's ability to make sound, informed medical 
decisions.
19
 Dissociative identity disorder (DID) is no exception; however, before 
discussing how DID affects capacity, it is crucial to introduce and outline the clinical 
features of DID, as well as the concept of decision-making capacity. 
1.1 What is Dissociative Identity Disorder? 
 1.1.1 Symptoms of DID 
 As previously mentioned, one of the most defining features of DID is the presence 
of multiple personality states.
20
  These states are referred to as "alter" personalities (or 
"alters" for short)
21
 and they appear individually from one another and seemingly have 
control of the person's body during their appearance.
22
 To be clear, all of an individual's 
personality states are considered alter personalities.
23
 According to Maiese, "[e]ach of 
these coexisting personalities seems to be a fully integrated and complex unit with its 
own memories, [behaviour] patterns, outlook, moods, ambitions, tastes, and habits."
24
 
Consequently, the continuous shifting between personality states often causes severe 
disturbances in the person's behaviour, consciousness, memory, affect, cognition, 
                                                             
18 Dunn et al., "Assessing Decisional Capacity," 1323.  
19 Manne Sjöstrand, Petter Karlsson, Lars Sandman, Gert Helgesson, Steffan Eriksson, and Niklas Juth, 
"Conceptions of Decision Making Capacity in Psychiatry: Interviews with Swedish Psychiatrists," BMC 
Medical Ethics 16 (2015), 35.  
20 American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5. "Dissociative Disorders." 
21 Paulette Marie Gillig, "Dissociative Identity Disorder: A Controversial Diagnosis," Psychiatry 6, no. 3 
(2009)  
22 Michelle Maiese, "Dissociative Identity Disorder and Ambivalence," Philosophical Explorations 19, no. 
3 (2016): 223. 
23
 Putnam,  Diagnosis and Treatment, 106-107. 
24 Maiese, "Dissociative Identity Disorder." 
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perception, and sensory-motor functioning.
25
 A common means by which DID can 
originate is repeated instances of trauma or abuse, as alter personalities are often formed 
as a means of escaping extreme pain and suffering.
26
 The DSM-5 states that a diagnosis 
of DID requires the presence of two or more alters.
27
 Findings regarding the average 
number of alters among DID patients are similar across surveys. For example, a survey of 
236 cases of DID (referred to as Multiple Personality Disorder at the time of the survey) 
conducted by Ross et al. revealed that the average number of alters is fifteen,
28
 while a 
similar survey conducted by Putnam indicates the mean number to be thirteen.
29
 It is not 
clear as to what exact factors cause differences in the number of alter personalities among 
DID patients;
30
 however, the type and length of trauma experienced and the age of onset 
have been suggested.
31
  
 Alter personalities assume various roles or functions for the patient with DID. 
32
 
Some examples include the following roles: "persecutor" personalities (personalities that 
express anger and frustration and may engage in self-mutilation or harm), "protector" 
personalities (" . . . those that protect the body from any perceived external danger" or 
internal threats, such as thoughts of suicide),
33
 "promiscuous" personalities (alters who 
tend to engage in risky behaviour and are impulsive);
34
 "internal self-helpers" (" . . . 
                                                             
25 American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5, "Dissociative Disorders." 
26 National Alliance on Mental Illness, "Dissociative Disorders," 2019.  Retrieved from 
https://www.nami.org/Learn-More/Mental-Health-Conditions/Dissociative-Disorders. 
27 American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5, "Dissociative Disorders." 
28 Colin A. Ross, G. Ron Norton, and Kay Wozney, "Multiple Personality Disorder: An Analysis of 236 
Cases," Canadian Journal of Psychiatry 34, no. 5 (1989), 414.  
29 Putnam, Diagnosis and Treatment, 123.  
30 Ibid., 123.  
31 Ibid., 123 
32 Ibid., 106-114.  
33 Ibid., 109 
34 Ibid., 111. 
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[those] who provide information and insight into the inner workings of the [personality] 
system" and can be invaluable during the delivery of therapy).
35
 
 DID also encompasses "sudden  alterations or discontinuities in sense of self and 
sense of agency."
36
 This usually manifests as periods of depersonalization: an out-of-
body experience whereby the individual is an external observer of their own actions, 
speech, and behaviour (accompanied by a feeling of loss of control over one's body).
37
 
Such discontinuity can also present as derealization, or " . . . a feeling of unreality or 
detachment from the environment [and one's surroundings]."
38
 Depersonalization and 
derealization often occur in tandem with one another, but they can occur independently.
39
 
Moreover, many people with DID experience dissociative amnesia.
40
 As the DSM-5 
states, dissociative amnesia primarily appears in the following three manners:  
   
  1) gaps in remote memory of personal life events (e.g., periods of  
  childhood or adolescence; some important life events, such as the  
  death of a grandparent, getting married, giving birth); 2) lapses in  
  dependable memory (e.g., of what happened today, of well-learned  
  skills such as how to do their job, use a computer read, drive); and 3)  
  discovery of evidence of their everyday actions and tasks that they do  
  not recollect doing (e.g., finding unexplained objects in their shopping  
  bags or among their possessions; finding perplexing writings or drawings  
  that they must have created; discovering injuries; "coming to" in the midst  
  of doing something).
41
 
 
As well, dissociative fugues are frequent among individuals with DID, mainly occurring  
                                                             
35 Ibid., 110. 
36 American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5, "Dissociative Disorders." 
37 Ibid. 
38 Putnam, Diagnosis and Treatment, 16.  
39 Ibid., 16.  
40 American Psychiatric Association, DSM-5, "Dissociative Disorders." 
41 Ibid. 
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as dissociated travel.
42
 Such individuals often cannot recall how or when they moved 
location and find themselves suddenly in a new place (e.g. travelling from home to work; 
moving around their house, etc.).
43
 Finally, individuals with DID can also experience a 
wide variety of psychiatric and neurological comorbidities.
44
 Some prominent examples 
include anxiety and depression disorders, post-traumatic stress disorder, sleep disorders 
(e.g. insomnia, sleepwalking, frequent nightmares), non-epileptic seizures, and 
personality disorders.
45
  
 1.1.2 Assessing Dissociation and DID  
 There exist various clinical tools psychiatrists can use to assess the severity of 
dissociation and dissociative symptoms. One assessment scheme is the Dissociative 
Experiences Scale (DES).
46
 This scheme is used to both determine the types of 
dissociative experiences patients endure and quantify these experiences by examining 
how often they occur.
47
 The experiences measured on the scale are dissociative amnesia, 
depersonalization, derealization, and absorption
48
 (a phenomenon whereby individuals 
become immersed in their own internal imagery and neglect attending to external reality 
or stimuli).
49
 Patients are asked to rate the frequency they experience each item on a 
                                                             
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Mayo Clinic, "Dissociative Disorders," 2019, Retrieved from mayoclinic.org/diseases-
conditions/dissociative-disorders/symptoms-causes/syc-20355215. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Bethany L. Brand, Judith G. Armstrong, and Richard L. Loewenstein, "Psychological Assessment of 
Patients with Dissociative Identity Disorder," Psychiatric Clinics of North America 29 (2006), 150. 
47 Eve M. Bernstein, and Frank W. Putnam, "Development, Reliability, and Validity of a Dissociation 
Scale," The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 174, no. 12 (1986), 731.  
48 Nirit Soffer-Dudek, Dana Lassri, Nir Soffer Dudek, and Golan Shahar, "Dissociative Absorption: An 
Empirically Unique, Clinically Relevant, Dissociative Factor," Consciousness and Cognition 36 (2015), 
338.  
49 Brand et al., "Psychological Assessment," 150.  
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Likert scale (ranging from 0% of the time to 100% of the time).
50
 However, if a patient 
obtains a high score on the DES, it does not necessarily indicate that they experience 
severe dissociation or have DID.
51
 Brand et al. state that, in certain instances, " . . . 
patients who are nondissociative and [later] questioned about their responses [on the 
DES] had not been thinking of truly dissociative experiences or had overrated the 
frequency with which they occur."
52
 As well, patients who are dissociative may 
underreport the frequency of such experiences on the DES, even though they provide 
details of "frequent and profound dissociative experiences" during a clinical interview.
53
 
It has also been shown that conflicting statements in the instructions of the questionnaire 
can lead to various interpretations and confusion regarding how to answer the items, 
which has led some to question the validity of the scale.
54
  
 While the DES can provide an indication of the presence of dissociative 
experiences, the current "gold standard" assessment tool for dissociation and making 
determinations of DID is the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative 
Disorders-Revised (SCID-D-R).
55
 Of the existing interview assessment tools, the SCID-
D-R is the only one that is based on clinical criteria outlined in the DSM.
56
 Dissociation 
is considered to be a "multidimensional" phenomenon, and clinicians need to take into 
account multiple factors when making diagnoses of DID and examining dissociation.
57
 
                                                             
50 Robert Stern, and Michael McDonald, "Diagnosing Dissociation, Or Why Measuring Multiple 
Personalities Doesn't Work," Skeptic Magazine 18, no. 4 (2013), 41-42. 
51 Ibid., 150. 
52 Ibid., 150. 
53 Ibid., 150. 
54 Stern and McDonald, "Diagnosing Dissociation," 42-43. 
55 Brand et al., "Psychological Assessment," 150. 
56 Ibid., 150.  
57 Ibid., 150. 
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The SCID-D-R is an ideal clinical tool because it assesses the five primary symptoms of 
pathological dissociation, namely amnesia, depersonalization, derealization, identity 
confusion, and identity alteration.
58
 Patients are asked a series of questions which require 
them to provide concrete examples of each symptom, and the clinician " . . . must be 
convinced that these experiences are dissociative in nature" in order to make a diagnosis 
of DID.
59
 Furthermore, the above dissociative symptoms can be placed on, what Temple 
refers to as, a "spectrum of severity."
60
 At the extreme high end of the spectrum are the 
"severe dissociative disorders," including DID and other specified dissociative disorder (a 
diagnosis given to patients who have dissociative symptoms but do not meet all of the 
necessary DSM-5 criteria for DID);
61
 at the extreme low end are normal, non-pathological 
instances of dissociation that most of us experience, such as intermittent absorption (e.g. 
day-dreaming) or "anxiety-induced distraction."
62
 This thesis and the arguments 
contained within are only concerned with patients who have been clinically diagnosed 
with DID. 
 As such, regarding severity among cases of DID,  the diversity of a patient's alter 
personalities and the number of times certain alter personalities emerge (as opposed to the 
total number of alters) determine the severity of the patient's condition.
63
 For example, if 
a patient has more persecutory alter personalities than helper personalities and the 
                                                             
58 Ibid., 150.  
59 Ibid., 150. 
60 Melanie J. Temple, "Understanding, Identifying, and Managing Severe Dissociative Disorders in General 
Psychiatric Settings," BJPsych Advances 25, no. 1 (2019), 14.  
61Temple, "Understanding, Identifying, and Managing," 14;18. 
62 Ibid., 14. 
63 Erdniç Öztürk, and Vedat Şar, "Formation and Functions of Alter Personalities in Dissociative Identity 
Disorder: A Theoretical and Clinical Elaboration," Journal of Psychiatry and Clinical Psychology 6, no. 6 
(2016): 00385, 6.   
  
14 
 
persecutory personalities are manifested more often, the patient would engage in self-
mutilation or self-harm more frequently than if their helper personalities were 
dominant.
64
 Thus, such dominance of persecutory alters would clearly indicate a more 
severe psychological disturbance.
65
 Similarly, Kluft notes that clinicians need to focus on 
the content of a DID patient's alter personality system and not the strict number of alters 
when examining complexity.
66
 For instance, he states that patients can replicate their 
system of alters during major life changes or stressors, thereby creating a "new and 
undamaged" version of the system and inactivating the previous system (a process termed 
"epochal division").
67
 In one patient, the same system of alter personalities was replicated 
five times as the patient moved through different levels of schooling as well as during her 
divorce.
68
 Even though there were numerous alters present, the core active content of her 
system was still the original, smaller set of alters.
69
 However, in another case, a patient 
who was repeatedly abused for over ten years developed a different alter after every 
instance of abuse to avoid dealing with the trauma, leading to a highly complex system 
due to the diversity among the alters.
70
  
 Before proceeding, it should be stated, though, that DID is a controversial 
diagnosis within psychiatry. Some psychiatrists are critical of the DSM criteria, as it does 
not include a clear definition of what constitutes an alter personality, nor any exclusion 
                                                             
64 Öztürk and Şar, "Formation and Function of Alter Personalities," 6.  
65 Ibid., 6. 
66 Richard P. Kluft, "Dealing with Alters: A Pragmatic Clinical Perspective," Psychiatric Clinics of North 
America 29, no. 1 (2006), 286;287. 
67 Ibid., 287. 
68 Ibid., 287. 
69 Ibid., 287. 
70 Ibid., 287. 
  
15 
 
criteria for the disorder.
71
 Therefore, such ambiguity has led some to argue that the 
disorder cannot be accurately diagnosed.
72
 This controversy needs to be kept in mind 
when examining the issue of decision-making capacity in patients who have been given a 
diagnosis of DID.   
1.2 Decision-Making Capacity 
 1.2.1 What Constitutes Decision-Making Capacity? 
 Having outlined the clinical attributes of dissociation and DID, I now turn to 
discussing the concept of decision-making capacity. Various scholars have put forth 
conceptions of the requirements for decision-making capacity. While there exist slight 
differences among them, there is general agreement regarding certain abilities that one 
would require to engage in medical decision-making.  
 One commonly cited requirement is  "understanding": the ability to understand 
and comprehend the information needed to make a particular decision.
73
 Regarding 
medical treatment decisions, Charland states that " . . . in order to be capable of 
consenting to or refusing a given treatment, a subject must have some basic 
understanding of the facts involved in that decision."
74
 Appelbaum and Grisso concur, as 
they assert that if a patient is unable to understand the facts and information about a 
specific treatment, this would preclude them from being able to consent to or refuse the 
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treatment in question.
75
 This would make sense, given that a patient who consents to a 
treatment without comprehending the information about the treatment itself would not be 
giving informed consent, and therefore, ethically, such consent should not be accepted. 
Appelbaum and Grisso also state that, in general, understanding involves not only the 
mental capabilities of " . . . reception, storage, and retrieval of information . . .", but also 
the understanding of causal relations.
76
 Pesiah et al. would agree as they view the ability 
to understand the dynamics of one's social environment and relationships as necessary to 
making sound decisions.
77
 Therefore, understanding can be regarded as the ability to 
comprehend that one's decisions will have an impact on them, and that one's decisions 
can also affect those around them. 
 In keeping with the notion that one's decisions affect them, another cited 
requirement for decision-making capacity is the ability to appreciate the consequences 
and outcomes of one's decisions ("appreciation").
78
 Appreciation takes understanding a 
step further by demanding one to consider whether their actions and choices will have a 
beneficial or detrimental effect.  Cairncross et al. view appreciation, in this sense, as " . . . 
the ability to apply [information] about one's own personal situation and to anticipate the 
likely outcome of a [decision]."
79
 Such a requirement would seem reasonable, as if one is 
unable to foresee the outcomes or implications of their decisions, then it would not be 
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possible for them to know whether or not the decisions they make are good for them. 
Moreover, Charland states that, when one makes decisions, " . . . it is their life . . . and 
future that are at stake."
80
 Therefore, to ensure that one makes decisions that preserve and 
support their future well-being, one must be able, as Buchanan and Brock assert, " . . .  to 
appreciate the nature and meaning of potential alternatives – what it would be and "feel" 
like to be in possible future states and to undergo various experiences."
81
  
 Closely related to appreciation is the ability to engage in reasoning. In the context 
of decision-making capacity in health care, no definitive, normative criteria for reasoning 
exist, with one cited reason for this being that if too high of a normative standard were 
accepted or insisted upon, then many capable patients may be rendered as incapable of 
making their own treatment decisions.
82
  However, there are certain attributes that are 
generally regarded as important when reasoning a treatment decision.
83
 One such 
attribute is the ability to rationally manipulate information by " . . . [comparing] the 
benefits and risks of various treatment options."
84
  This would require the patient to first 
ascertain the benefits and risks of a single option and weigh them against other options to 
reach a decision.
85
 As well, Siegel et al. state that reasoning about a treatment decision 
would involve " . . .  [moving] from a particular premise or set of premises to their 
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conclusion regarding the particular treatment decision in a logical manner."
86
 A patient 
who is capable of this would be able to answer questions such as "How did you decide to 
accept or reject the recommended treatment?" or "What makes [your] chosen [option] 
better than [an alternative option]?"
87
 To be clear, what is being examined here is a 
patient's decision-making process and not the "reasonableness of a particular decision," as 
a patient possesses the freedom to make treatment decisions that are considered 
unreasonable by their physician or care team.
88
 As Appelbaum and Grisso state, " . . . 
patients should be able to indicate the major factors in their decisions and the importance 
assigned to them."
89
 
 One other noted requirement for decision-making capacity is the ability to 
communicate or outwardly express (verbally or otherwise) one's decisions and preferred 
choices.
90
 With regards to medical treatment decisions, if a patient is unable to indicate 
their preferred treatment option, it would be impossible for their decision to be 
implemented or acted upon;
91
 therefore, "[t]he ability to communicate choices is accepted 
almost universally as a sign of competence to consent to treatment . . .."
92
 This 
requirement could also include " . . . the ability to maintain and communicate stable 
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choices long enough for them to be implemented."
93
 Appelbaum and Grisso state that 
while patients can change their minds and have sufficient reasons for doing so that would 
not preclude them from being capable of making treatment decisions,  
   . . . repeated reversals of intent, particularly if they can be  
  linked to a diagnosable psychiatric disorder and can prevent  
  the implementation of any consistent approach, may suggest  
  the presence of substantial impairment.
94
 
 
 Many scholars also believe that possessing a set of values is necessary for 
decision-making capacity. For example, Buchanan and Brock assert that values and a 
conception of what is good are necessary for an individual " . . . to evaluate particular 
[decisional] outcomes as benefits or harms, goods or evils, and to assign different relative 
weight or importance to them."
95
 This viewpoint echoes the previous discussion 
regarding appreciation, as one's values allow them " . . . to draw inferences about the 
consequences of making a certain choice and to compare alternative outcomes based on 
how they further one's good or promote one's ends."
96
 Wicclair adds that while one's 
values may not be fully developed or detailed, some degree of consistency and coherency 
is necessary.
97
 Lo concurs and asserts that, for medical treatment decisions, total 
inconsistency in values would cause a patient to " . . . change their minds back and forth 
repeatedly without any changes in external circumstances, [making it] impossible to carry 
out plans for medical care."
98
 Consequently, a lack of consistent values would undermine 
the aforementioned requirement of being able to effectively communicate a decisional 
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choice.
99
 As well, since individuals can have multiple values and certain decisions may 
not necessarily align with all of their values, consistency would allow a patient to set 
priorities and assign weight to certain values.
100
 This would promote a person's ability to 
rationally reason through a decision, as their values would guide and shape how they 
view the benefits and risks and ultimately decide if they are willing to accept the outcome 
of the decision. 
 1.2.2 Ethical Importance of Decision-Making Capacity for Health Care Patients 
 Tannjso states that, within health care, " . . . a strong presumption exists for 
allowing adult [patients], who can make their own decisions about their need for health 
and social care, to have their own say [with regards to their care]."
101
 Why would 
allowing patients with capacity the free will to make their own decisions be ethically 
important? In his work On Liberty, Mill puts forth the argument that such an allowance 
serves to support an individual's welfare.
102
 He states that the interest a person has in their 
own welfare and life is not shared to the same extent by others.
103
 Beyond this, Mill also 
asserts that " . . . with respect to [their] own feelings and circumstances, the most ordinary 
[person] has means of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed 
by anyone else."
104
Applying these points within a health care context, while a physician 
or care team can sympathize with a patient and hold their well-being in high regard, 
ultimately, it is the patient's life and health that are at stake when making treatment 
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decisions, not the lives of the health care professionals, and it is the patient who must 
bear the outcomes of a decision.
105
 Only the patient possesses a " . . . knowledge of [their] 
particular subjective aims and values that are likely to be affected by whatever decision is 
made."
106
 Since the patient has the greatest stake in a medical treatment decision (i.e. 
their life), allowing a patient with capacity to choose their course of treatment affords 
them the ability to make the choice that is most in line with their values and what they 
deem to be important to them. In turn, this respects the patient's autonomy and self-
determination.
107
 As Beauchamp and Childress state, respecting a patient's autonomy 
means " . . . [acknowledging] their right to hold views, to make choices, and to take 
actions based on their values and beliefs."
108
 Patients have an " . . . interest in making 
important decisions about [their] own [lives]," and since capably expressed choices and 
decisions are based on the values of the patient making the decision, allowing such 
patients to exercise their capacity also enables them to exercise their autonomy.
109
  
  However, it is regarded as ethically acceptable or appropriate to intervene in 
treatment decisions where a patient has been deemed to lack decision-making capacity 
for those particular decisions.
110
 Bassford states that if a patient cannot comprehend the 
nature of a decision or its consequences or outcomes, they are unable to self-govern their 
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decision-making in this instance.
111
 Patient autonomy and paternalistic intervention are 
regarded as "reciprocal," meaning that as a patient's autonomous capabilities to make a 
particular decision decrease, the need to make the decision on behalf of the patient 
increases, and vice versa.
112
 Carter adds that if an agent is unable to  " . . . use relevant 
concepts,. . . recognize relevant information . . ., appreciate the consequences of [a] 
proposed [action], and . . . be intellectually capable of deliberation," their "action rights" 
(rights that permit individuals to perform or carry out actions) are limited in 
circumstances where the action in question requires these abilities.
113 The abilities noted 
by Carter correspond directly with the aforementioned requirements of medical decision-
making capacity, implying that, in circumstances where patients who do not meet the 
capacity requirements, they can be denied decision-making capacity. In accordance with 
promoting patient welfare, not allowing patients without capacity to make treatment 
decisions serves to "[protect] [patients] . . .  from the harmful consequences . . . of their 
own choices," as incompetently made choices " . . . may fail to serve [their] good or well-
being."
114
  
 As alluded to by Bassford and Carter, it is necessary to note that decision-making 
capacity is not "global," meaning that an individual cannot be " . . . deemed capable or 
incapable of making all decisions . . .."
115
 Capacity is determined in light of the particular 
task or decisional domain at hand, and it " . . . cannot be extrapolated from one task [or 
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domain] to another."
116
 For example, the capacity task for consenting to research would 
be different from that of appointing a power of attorney or making financial decisions.
117
 
Moreover, decision-making capacity can vary within a specific type of decision.
118
 For 
example, medical treatment decisions can differ widely in terms of the complexity of the 
decision, ranging from somewhat simple decisions (e.g. choosing to have a blood test) to 
more difficult, arduous decisions (e.g. deciding whether or not to undergo risky surgery). 
Therefore, physicians may deem a patient capable of making certain treatment decisions 
but not others.
119
 As well, a patient could presumably lack capacity for a treatment 
decision simply because they lack sufficient information or understanding of the decision 
at hand. However, through discussion with the patient, a physician or care team can 
provide this information or clarity to help the patient become capable of making the 
treatment decision. Such a notion of helping a patient become capable is not directly 
addressed in the forthcoming arguments of this thesis. When a patient does not have 
capacity for a particular decision, a substitute decision-maker is identified to make 
decisions on behalf of the patient.
120
 Decisions made for an individual when intervening 
on the grounds of absence of capacity must be guided by, as Rawls notes, " . . . what is 
known about the [person's] more permanent aims and preferences."
121
  Such 
consideration of a patient's values and preferences serves to promote the patient's 
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autonomy through making the decision that would most likely be the decision that the 
patient themselves would make if they were capable of doing so.
122
 
 Lo indicates various ways that physicians can promote the decision-making 
capacity of particular patient groups at risk of being deemed incapable of making 
decisions, such as elderly patients and patients with psychiatric symptoms and/or 
cognitive impairment, in order to promote self-governance over their decision-making.
123
 
In particular, he asserts that physicians need to recognize and acknowledge that capacity 
is fluid and can change throughout a patient's lifetime and treatment process.
124
 For 
example, illnesses that may impair cognitive function and hinder capacity may improve 
over time or be cured;
125
 therefore, a previously incapable patient may need their capacity 
re-evaluated upon improvement.
126
 As well, certain psychiatric symptoms may worsen 
when a patient is hospitalized or placed in unfamiliar settings, so physicians should be 
aware of this before assuming a patient with psychiatric symptoms lacks capacity.
127
 
Pesiah et al. would concur, as they assert that " . . . incapacity is no longer diagnosis 
bound . . ." and it is inappropriate to assume incapacity solely due to a diagnosis of a 
psychiatric or mental disorder.
128
 Sjöstrand et al. maintain that it is possible, in some 
cases, for a patient's capacity to be retained during severe mental illness.
129
 Considering 
these points, it would be reasonable to opine that assuming incapacity based only on 
mental illness would not only unethically undermine a potentially capable patient's 
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autonomy, but also may result in potential distress or cause them to distrust their 
physician and, by extension, the health care system itself. Lo states that vulnerable 
patients are more likely to be fearful of strangers and discussing treatments with 
individuals whom they do not know well, so acting in ways that foster trust and comfort 
is imperative to providing care to these patients.
130
  
 Having examined the concepts of DID and decision-making capacity in detail, I 
now turn to outlining two contrasting viewpoints regarding the nature of a DID patient, 
namely the single person thesis and multiple person thesis. In Chapter Two, I will defend 
the position that the single person thesis offers a more plausible interpretation of an 
individual with DID.      
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Chapter 2: A Defence of the Single Person Thesis 
 In 1886, Robert Louis Stevenson published his novel The Strange Case of Dr. 
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.
131
 This novel tells the story of Dr. Henry Jekyll, a respected and 
successful intellectual who, unbeknownst to those around him, possesses a dark, evil side 
to his personality.
132
 At times, Jekyll accedes to this evilness by committing atrocious 
acts, but he does so covertly to avoid damaging his social status.
133
 However, through 
experimentation, he develops a concoction that enables him to " . . . free [the] evil in him" 
by transforming into a man named Edward Hyde.
134
 Unlike Jekyll, Hyde is purely evil 
with no moral compass.
135
 Today, the eponymous term "Jekyll and Hyde" " . . . has 
become a synonym for multiple personality in scientific and lay literature."
136
 
 One could theoretically interpret Jekyll and Hyde as separate entities from one 
another, as their outwardly opposing traits, moral characters, and values place them " . . . 
constantly at war with each other";
137
 however, one could also regard Hyde as a fragment 
of Jekyll's personality, as in the novel, Jekyll describes Hyde as " . . . a second form and 
countenance substituted, none the less natural to me because [he] [is] the expression, and 
[bears] the stamp, of lower elements in my soul."
138
 Therefore, in this view, Jekyll and 
Hyde  may not be so distinct from one another, as Hyde is a manifestation of the evilness 
that resides within Jekyll. While Jekyll and Hyde is not a case of dissociative identity 
                                                             
131 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 15th ed., s.v. "The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde," 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Strange-Case-of-Dr-Jekyll-and-Mr-Hyde.  
132 Shubh Singh and Subho Chakrabarti, "A Study in Dualism: The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. 
Hyde," Indian Journal of Psychiatry 50, no. 3 (2008), 221. 
133 Singh and Chakrabati, "A Study in Dualism," 221. 
134 Ibid., 221. 
135 Ibid., 221. 
136 Ibid., 221. 
137 Ibid., 222. 
138 Ibid., 222. 
  
27 
 
disorder (DID) per se, these conflicting interpretations regarding the connection (or lack 
thereof) between Jekyll and Hyde mirror two existing theories that attempt to explain the 
nature of someone with DID: the single person thesis and the multiple person thesis.      
 The single person thesis states that the alter personalities of an individual with 
DID are altered states of the patient and fragments of the individual's personality (similar 
to interpreting Hyde as a fragment of Jekyll's identity).
139
 In this view, the individual is a 
single person, whose alter personalities are " . . . [states] [of] one person in which only 
the person's concept of self has been replaced, distorted, and diminished."
140
 However, 
similar to the notion that Jekyll and Hyde are distinct entities, the multiple person thesis 
posits that alter personalities are separate persons because they each possess " . . . [a] 
distinct [sense] of themselves, [a] distinct [centre] of self-consciousness, and [a] different 
body [image]."
141
 According to the theory, this distinctness is due to an "epistemic or 
phenomenological barrier" that prevents the personalities from accessing each others' 
consciousness.
142
 Such a barrier affords  personality states independent agency from one 
another, and, thus, " . . . if there are two or more centers of consciousness . . . or loci of 
agency, then there are two or more persons in a single body."
143
 
 Before I discuss how DID impacts medical decision-making capacity and present 
an approach to determining a DID patient's capacity for medical treatment decisions, it is 
necessary to adopt either the single person thesis (SPT) or multiple person thesis (MPT), 
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as these theories have vastly different implications for judging the decision-making 
capacity of a patient with DID.  For instance, if the MPT is favoured, then assessing the 
capacity of a patient would be difficult as the person (i.e. personality) who is consented 
for a particular treatment option would not necessarily be the person who bears the 
consequences of the treatment decision or whose capacity was assessed to begin with. 
Under the MPT, each alter personality would require an assessment of their capacity 
because it would be possible for them to capably exercise their individual agencies to 
make their own treatment choices. Conversely, if one adopts the SPT, the patient, as a 
singular person, only has one center of agency. The term "center of agency" refers to the 
autonomous agency of a singular being. Therefore, instead of assessing capacity for each 
personality, it would have to be determined whether or not the presence of alter 
personalities has sufficiently disrupted the patient's agency enough to preclude them from 
possessing capacity for their own treatment decisions. In this chapter, I discuss the 
overlap that exists between alter personalities, as well as the phenomena of dissociation 
and integration, in defending the position that the SPT, as opposed to the MPT, provides 
a more plausible interpretation of an individual with DID and their alter personalities. 
2.1 Overlap between Alter Personalities 
 As previously mentioned, the MPT states that there exists an epistemic and 
phenomenological barrier between alter personalities; however, alter personalities share 
more than the MPT would lead one to believe. This section will discuss the overlap 
between alter personalities and, in turn, demonstrate that the existence of such a rigid 
barrier is a somewhat inaccurate analysis. 
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 First, there is evidence that the semantic memory of a patient with DID overlaps 
across personality states and remains stable.
144
 Semantic memory includes the memory of  
concepts and ideas that are not linked to personal experience.
145
 This includes factual 
information, common knowledge (e.g. colours, letters of the alphabet, etc.), and 
procedures (e.g. how to get dressed, how to cook a meal, etc.).
146
 Such overlap would 
indicate that personality states have access to the same reservoir of semantic knowledge 
and information, as when the individual undergoes a switch of personality states their 
ability to survive and carry out day-to-day tasks is maintained.
147
 Similarly, the capacities 
and skills of the individual alters are not unique to one particular alter.
148
 An example of 
this is the case of Kim Noble.
149
 Kim was exposed to painting as a means of therapy, and, 
subsequently, fourteen of Kim's alter personalities started to paint.
150
 In this case, what is 
suggested is that once Kim started to paint, this ability became accessible to all of her 
alter personalities and was not exclusive to a particular alter. This supports Braude's 
notion of a central repository of capacities that are shared by all alter personalities and 
from which an individual's personality states can draw upon.
151
 Such ability sharing 
contradicts the MPT, because, unlike alter personalities, distinct persons develop skills 
and attributes independently of one another, and just because one person possesses a 
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particular skill does not mean that everyone will acquire the same skill. As an example, 
hypothetically, if I know how to swim and my brother does not, then my brother, as a 
separate person from me, will not know how to swim simply because I have the ability to 
do so.  
 However, consider the following case of DID. Born in Milan, Italy, Elena 
possessed two alters, dubbed the "French personality" and "Italian personality" by her 
clinician because of the language difference between the alters.
152
 The "Italian 
personality" only spoke Elena's first language of Italian;
153
 however, the "French 
personality" could only speak French, and even when reading Italian-language texts, this 
alter would believe that she was reading a text written in French.
154
 On the surface, this 
would suggest that alter personalities can acquire different language skills independently 
of one another: an observation a proponent of the MPT might use to argue that alter 
personalities possess independent centers of agency.  
 Even though they speak different languages, Elena's alters are similar in that they 
are each limited to the utilization of one language, and the ability to speak both Italian 
and French was acquired by Elena prior to dissociation (which occurred in her early 
twenties).
155
 Deeley states that alter personalities cannot possess abilities or capacities 
that are not available to the host individual in question.
156
 Elena's alters exemplify this 
point, as they could only speak languages to which Elena had been exposed and learned. 
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Thus, I would argue that if alter personalities were distinct persons with their own loci of 
agency, they would be able to develop and hone abilities according to own free will and 
not be limited to the abilities possessed by the host individual. As I will elaborate upon 
later, this would indicate that alter personalities are not truly autonomous agents (as 
suggested by the MPT). Moreover, the case of Elena demonstrates Braude's point that       
" . . . the traits and abilities manifested by or latent in the pre-dissociative personality 
begin to get distributed throughout the [alter personalities]."
157
 Such distribution strongly 
suggests that the SPT is more plausible than the MPT, as it indicates not only the sharing 
of abilities or capacities between alter personalities, but also that personality states are 
fragments of a singular person. 
 Furthermore, although personality states assume specific roles or functions for the 
individual with DID, " . . . the functional specificity of alters does not require [them] to 
have traits or abilities shared with no other alters (or split-off completely from the rest of 
the individual's activities)."
158
 Task-specific alters are commonplace among individuals 
with DID.
159
 As an example, Miller states that one of her patients possesses a young alter 
personality who emerges when the need to use a computer or technology arises, 
especially at the patient's workplace.
160
 Braude notes that a task-specific alter who, for 
instance, shops for groceries, would require the abilities of reading lists and labels, 
making mathematical calculations, comparing sizes and prices, and interacting with 
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others;
161
 however, such capacities are not limited to grocery shopping, as, for example, 
many other tasks and functions involve communicating and engaging with other 
individuals (e.g. carrying out projects in the workplace, caring for one's children, etc.), so 
other alters can also possess these abilities to carry out their functions for the 
individual.
162
 Thus, it is not specific capacities that distinguish alter personalities from 
one another, but rather the combination of traits they exhibit from the central repository, 
and 
   . . . the functional specificity of [alter] personalities actually  
  discourages the appeal to distinct subsystems lacking a deeper  
  unity, since the capacities . . . that distinguish different alters are  
  overlapping and interlocking parts of a single individual's full  
  range of dispositions.
163
 
 
  A final consideration is that alter personalities can observe the actions of other 
alters, or hear the voice of another alter, which contradicts the MPT in that there can be 
shared phenomenological awareness among alter personalities.
164
 This is referred to as 
co-consciousness.
165
 Brown states that co-consciousness often involves an " interior 
dialogue" or communication among the manifested alter personality and the other alters 
who observe the actions or "outward behaviour" of the manifested alter.
166
 There are 
many examples of co-consciousness and its phenomena in the medical literature. For 
instance, Ribáry et al. cite a case they call the "Phottae system," whereby a female 
patient's twenty alter personalities can "hear" each other's thoughts and are in constant 
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communication with one another.
167
 Another case involves the personality system of a 
twenty-three year-old female patient, which the patient characterizes as a "large 
community of housemates" due to frequent "verbal interactions" among the alters.
168
 The 
existence of co-consciousness makes sense for two reasons. First, as mentioned in the 
DSM-5, individuals with DID experience episodes of depersonalization, which involves 
observance of their own actions and speech.
169
 Second, as demonstrated in the examples 
above, it is possible for alter personalities to be aware of, and recognize, each other's 
existence as alter personalities within one body: a phenomenon referred to as "mutual 
awareness."
170
 
2.2 The Nature of Dissociation 
 Beyond the possibility of shared abilities and awareness among alter personalities, 
the SPT can be supported by the phenomenon of dissociation itself. Only the SPT 
provides justification for, what Maiese terms, " . . . the adaptive function of alter-
formation."
171
 Alter personalities are generally created in response to " . . . a single pre-
dissociative individual's experience of trauma [and their] desire or need to cope with 
it."
172
 An individual's set of alter personalities are unique and adaptive to that individual, 
as how the individual dissociates (i.e. what kind of alters are generated and how many are 
created) is dependent upon their specific traumas and conflicts, as well as what the 
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individual needs to shield themselves from their trauma.
173
 Hence, this supports the SPT, 
as it is evident that alter personalities arise from a singular self, and any future 
proliferation of alters can be plausibly attributed to  " . . . the same pre-dissociative 
synthesizing self that orchestrated (and needed to orchestrate) the initial dissociations."
174
 
Also referred to as the "original personality"
175
 or "trauma-self,"
176
 the pre-dissociative 
self is the identity of the individual that experienced trauma prior to the onset of 
dissociation, and it remains hidden but it can be accessed through the course of 
therapy.
177
 In summary, 
   . . . since [the] traumas presumably all happened to the same  
  subject, and since the conflicts and needs to which the traumas  
  lead seem to make sense only with respect to a single agent, the   
  subsequent dissociative coping strategies (and ongoing attempts  
  to sustain them) likewise seem to make sense only with respect  
  to a single agent.
178
 
 
 Furthermore, Maiese asserts that the underpinning logic of dissociation lends 
itself to interpret an individual with DID as a singular person.
179
 Theoretically, if x 
becomes dissociated from y, then some sort of division or barrier now exists between x 
and y.
180
 Translating this to DID, when an individual dissociates their psychologically 
traumatizing mental states from conscious awareness (i.e. their alter personalities), 
emotions, memories, and feelings associated with their trauma cannot be consciously 
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accessed.
181
 According to Maiese, " . . . what [becomes] dissociated, [then], . . . are 
[states] that the subject already has registered [as traumatizing], and it is impossible for a 
subject to block conscious awareness of states that [they] already [have] registered unless 
these are [their] own mental states."
182
 Since alter personalities are not consciously aware 
of the subject's traumatized mental states, they would not be capable of doing the 
dissociating;
183
 thus, this presupposes that dissociation is carried out by the traumatized 
pre-dissociative self (a singular person), which supports the SPT.
184
 
 Moreover, the concept of dissociation raises an intriguing question: does an 
individual who dissociates into multiple alter personalities possess control over the 
dissociative process? Scholarly opinion is divided on this issue. For example, van der 
Hart asserts that dissociation into alter personalities is automatic or reflexive.
185
 On the 
other hand, both Sarbin and Spanos state that alter personality formation is a goal-
directed response to coping with the particular social circumstances and environment in 
which an individual finds themselves.
186
 Segall agrees with Sarbin's and Spanos's claim, 
but adds that the switching between alter personalities could be an automatic process 
"with meaning," in that it " . . . [reflects] changing organismic and social stimulus 
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conditions and [promotes] (or [is] at least "intended" to promote) sociobiological 
adaptation."
187
  
 I would state that given the aforementioned "adaptive function" of alter 
formation,
188
 it would be reasonable to posit the existence of some degree of control over 
the nature of one's alters to ensure that the specific coping needs of the individual are 
met. The adaptive function would be in line with Sarbin's and Spanos's commentary 
regarding dissociation as a means of coping with one's social environment, as one's social 
circumstances are unique to them as well, and the created alters would have to allow the 
individual to cope within their own environment. While I am sympathetic to Segall's 
notion that switching may be automatic and reflexive, as one's social stimuli and other 
events may change suddenly and could necessitate a swift emergence of another alter 
better suited for that circumstance, it is plausible that alter formation is not completely 
random or reflexive (as suggested by van der Hart) given their specificity.  
 If an individual does have some control over the nature of their alters, since not 
every individual who experiences trauma uses dissociation as a coping mechanism,
189
 I 
also argue that it would be possible for an individual with DID to possess some degree of 
self-motivation to dissociate, and such motivation could only plausibly be possessed by 
the pre-dissociative self. Given that, as previously mentioned, alter personalities do not 
register the individual's psychologically damaging mental states,  it would appear that 
alters would have no clear reason to want to engage in dissociation. Therefore, to assert 
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that alter personalities are the sources of dissociation would be illogical because any 
impetus to dissociate would have to come from an entity that seeks to dissociate itself 
from traumatic memories, emotions, and experiences. As Kluft states, it is the original 
personality (i.e. pre-dissociative self) who " . . . [splits] off the first new personality in 
order to help the body survive a severe stress,"
190
 and Putnam adds that this entity 
continues the proliferation of alters.
191
 Since alter personalities are derived from, and 
created by, the pre-dissociative self (a singular agent), the phenomenon of dissociation 
plausibly indicates the superiority of the SPT over the MPT.               
2.3 Integration as a Challenge to the Multiple Person Thesis 
 A commonly employed treatment for DID is integration:
192
 a psychotherapeutic 
process utilized to gradually reverse pathological dissociation through combining (or 
"integrating") an individual's alter personalities.
193
 Integration involves "psychic 
restructuring," whereby the " . . . separate elements of each alter [are synthesized] into a 
more unified global personality . . .."
194
 As I will outline below, integration poses two 
salient contradictions to the MPT.   
 First, integration challenges the notion that there exists a rigid barrier between the 
consciousnesses of alter personalities (as put forth by the MPT). When alter personalities 
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integrate, they can exist in a hybrid state referred to as "co-presence," which occurs when 
full integration of an individual's set of alters is either partial or incomplete.
195
 However, 
what is fascinating about co-presence is that, considering hypothetical alter personalities 
A and B (and hybrid personality AB), " . . . the experiences and psychological 
characteristics of AB can apparently be a composite of the distinctive inner lives of A and 
B – a kind of cognitive cocktail."196 In order to combine experiences and inner conscious 
states, alter personalities would have to be able to access each other's consciousness. 
Therefore, in my view, to posit a phenomenological barrier between alter personalities 
would seem somewhat illogical because if alter personalities possess separate, 
impenetrable centers of consciousness, co-presence would be impossible to achieve. 
Moreover, the ultimate goal of integration is to combine an individual's full range of alter 
personalities into one single personality.
197
 Since this process would involve alter 
personalities combining their conscious states to create one composite state, it is 
improbable that they could be considered independent persons, as a person cannot 
integrate their consciousness with another's in such a manner. 
 Second, I argue that integration calls into question the notion that alter 
personalities can be considered autonomous agents each in themselves (as the MPT 
suggests through the claim that alter personalities are distinct loci of agency). To be an 
autonomous agent, " . . . one must be capable of self-control, self-determination, and self-
governance."
198
 Since integration involves morphing personalities together, as well as the 
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elimination of certain personalities,
199
 this would imply that alter personalities themselves 
do not possess the self-control or self-determination to maintain their own fundamental 
characteristics or existence. Therefore, in light of this, alter personalities should not be 
considered autonomous agents. 
 While an alter personality appears to possess control over the individual's body 
during their manifestation,
200
 I argue that the individual's locus of autonomous agency is 
actually their pre-dissociative self. As previously discussed, it is plausible that 
dissociation is, to a degree, autonomous, and it is carried out by the pre-dissociative self. 
It would follow, then, that integration is controlled by the pre-dissociative self, as 
integration permanently alters or removes the safe havens the pre-dissociative self has 
generated to block out the individual's traumatic past (i.e. the alter personalities), and this 
self would have to be willing and ready to lose these personalities. This is supported by 
Öztürk and Şar, as they state that it is the pre-dissociative or trauma-self that determines 
the patient's attitude toward integration.
201
 Therefore, in my opinion, since the pre-
dissociative self possesses control to bring alter personalities into existence as well as 
terminate their existence, they are the entity that houses the individual's self-governance. 
And since alter personalities originate or are derived from the pre-dissociative self,
202
 the 
self-control displayed by them could also stem from the pre-dissociative self. As a result, 
in my opinion, alter personalities would not be autonomous entities of their own accord, 
but rather vehicles through which the individual's autonomy is expressed. Therefore, this 
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would indicate the existence of one, singular center of autonomous agency in an 
individual with DID, which supports the SPT. Considering that this thesis is examining 
the medical decision-making capacity of patients with DID, if alter personalities can 
express or channel the individual's autonomy, this raises questions regarding how 
physicians should proceed when alters differ in their choices regarding treatments and 
how to determine which alters' choices should be accepted. These questions will be 
explored in Chapter Four.             
 A proponent of the MPT could argue that alter personalities sometimes display 
deception to avoid integrating by not emerging or manifesting,
203
 which could suggest 
some level of self-governance. However, a more plausible explanation is that such 
resistance can be attributed to the pre-dissociative self resisting integration. Öztürk and 
Şar state that " . . . resistances of the trauma-self . . . [prevent] the patient from actively 
participating in therapeutic work."
204
 Like the individual's autonomy, the individual's 
alter personalities would only channel this resistance. Such channelling has been noted in 
the psychiatric literature, as alter personalities reflect the view or perspective of the pre-
dissociative self towards the individual's trauma, thereby rendering the pre-dissociative or 
trauma-self as the "psychological centrum of the [individual]."
205
 Thus, this centrality and 
channeling would support the existence of a singular locus of agency in an individual 
with DID (and, in turn, the SPT).  
 Now that I have demonstrated that an individual with DID can be regarded as a 
singular person with one locus of agency, in Chapter Three, I will assess the decision-
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making capacity and agency of such an individual as a whole. In turn, I will assert that 
the presence of alter personalities can impede a person with DID from executing agency 
as a being that is capable of, and responsible for, their own decision-making.   
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Chapter 3: Possible Impediments to Medical Decision-Making Capacity and Agency 
of a Person with Dissociative Identity Disorder  
 Consider the following hypothetical scenario: Cindy is a middle-aged woman 
with dissociative identity disorder (DID) and possesses three alter personalities who 
frequently switch between one another. She is at the hospital for an appointment with a 
rheumatologist because she has been diagnosed with chronic osteoarthritis in her knee 
and is exploring potential treatment options. At the start of the consultation, the 
rheumatologist speaks with the personality "Laura," who happens to be the personality 
that was manifested at the time when Cindy received the diagnosis. Laura seems to 
favour knee replacement surgery as the preferred option, as she wants to be able to walk 
pain-free and return to her active day-to-day lifestyle without risk of a future flare-up. 
However, halfway through the consultation, the alter personality "Emily" emerges. Emily 
is aware of the diagnosis, but tells the rheumatologist that she has a fear of general 
anaesthesia and, because of the anxiety it causes her, she would prefer a non-surgical 
option at all costs. As the physician continues to outline the options she is eligible for, 
Cindy begins to look dazed and confused as her final alter "Anna" emerges, who, 
unaware that she has arthritis or a physician's appointment, questions why she is in the 
hospital and asks what is wrong with her.  
 In this case, the alter personalities Laura and Emily seem assured in their 
expressed opinions and they each give plausible reasons for why they would choose their 
preferred option; yet, the fact that their choices conflict, combined with the presence of 
Anna who is ignorant to the diagnosis altogether, would first force the physician to 
question whether Cindy has the capacity to make this decision. Other similar cases would 
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present the same challenge; thus, at this point I will turn to assessing the medical 
decision-making capacity of an individual with DID.   
 In the previous chapter, a series of arguments were presented supporting the 
notion that an individual with DID is a singular person with one centre of agency (i.e. the 
single person thesis), and that alter personalities should not be considered autonomous, 
self-governing agents in and of themselves. As well, I stated that adopting this position 
enables one to examine the decision-making capacity of a person with DID in light of 
their whole being to determine if the presence of alter personalities would compromise 
their capacity and agency. Thus, viewing an individual with DID through this lens, in this 
chapter, I will demonstrate that the presence of alter personalities could, in certain 
circumstances, impede or diminish the overall medical decision-making capacity and 
agency of a person with DID. While Maiese makes a similar claim regarding the 
impediment of an individual's agency due to dissociation into alter personalities, she 
situates her argument within the context of determining if such an impediment absolves a 
person with DID from moral or legal culpability for any committed crimes.
206
 Other 
scholars have also put forth varying positions on the issue of agency and culpability 
regarding individuals with DID.
207
 However, I will, instead, contextualize this 
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impediment solely within the concept of medical decision-making capacity, and, in turn, 
demonstrate how each of the requirements or attributes for capacity regarding medical 
decisions (as outlined in Chapter One) could be hampered in such a person. 
3.1 Appreciation and Expressing a Choice 
 3.1.1 Moral Responsibility and Appreciation 
 According to Glannon, if an individual possesses " . . . the capacity for beliefs 
about the foreseeable consequences of [their] actions . . ..," they are morally responsible 
for those actions.
208
 In other words, he states that one would have to be able to ascertain 
the consequences of a particular action prior to committing it in order to be held morally 
accountable for the outcomes of the act in question.
209
 This claim seems logical, as, 
hypothetically, a child who steals their sibling's toy, but is unaware that stealing is 
generally considered to be a wrongful act, would not be held accountable for their 
behaviour because, prior to the act of stealing, it would not have been possible for them 
to evaluate the ramifications and consequences of such an act; however, if the child steals 
the toy again, they are morally responsible for that action, since prior to stealing the toy 
they were aware that it is wrong to steal.  
 Considering Glannon's assertion, there are certain domains of decision-making for 
which one can be held morally responsible, notably medical decision-making. The 
medical treatment decisions a patient makes for themselves or those made for a patient by 
a substitute decision-maker generate outcomes that could significantly affect the patient's 
welfare; thus, it is reasonable to state that engaging in morally responsible medical 
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decision-making would require the ability to draw possible conclusions about the effects 
or implications of treatment decisions or choices on the patient before executing them. 
This correlates directly with the aforementioned notion of appreciation, of which an 
integral facet is the ability to anticipate the implications of one's decisions. Thus, the 
following question is raised: could a person with DID possess this ability and, in turn, be 
morally responsible for their medical decision-making? 
 Maiese asserts that " . . . in [certain] cases of DID, there may be so many memory 
gaps and disruptions in the connectedness between mental states that it is difficult for 
[some individuals] to foresee what they will do or assess the long-term consequences of 
their actions."
210
 Such disruptions could be due to amnesia regarding conscious 
experiences between alter personalities (a common feature of DID as previously 
mentioned).
211
As well, alter personalities can exist in different amnesiac states of 
awareness, including "asymmetrical awareness"
212
 (one alter is aware of another's actions 
and thoughts but not vice versa) and "two-way amnesia"
213
 (one's alters are not aware of 
each other's existence). Braude notes that persons with DID only occupy, or act through, 
one alter personality at a time.
214
 Therefore, depending on which alter personality is 
manifested and the degree of awareness between a patient's alter personalities, it may be 
difficult (or impossible) for a patient with DID to foresee (i.e. appreciate) the implications 
of a treatment decision for all of their alter personalities if they are unaware of how the 
outcomes of such a decision would affect them in all of their personality states. 
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Therefore, this impediment would diminish a person's ability to make sound decisions for 
themselves (as a whole). As Braude states, individuals with DID who cannot foresee the 
implications of their actions are not morally responsible agents because " . . .  if each 
[alter personality's] evaluative capacities are inadequate, . . . then it may be that the 
[person] as a whole cannot judge [their] actions in a suitably integrated and 
comprehensive way."
215
   
 However, as discussed in Chapter Two, in some cases of DID, alter personalities 
mutually share conscious awareness and can observe the actions of other alters through 
depersonalization. In such cases, individuals could, theoretically, possess insight into how 
they act or think while occupying their range of alter personalities and, echoing Braude's 
point, evaluate the causal effects of a treatment decision in a more holistic and 
"comprehensive" manner. Thus, it should be noted that if a person with DID possesses 
such insight, the ability to appreciate the implications of medical treatment decisions on 
their entire being (and engage in morally responsible medical decision-making) would 
not be so hampered. Even though this ability can be impeded in persons with DID, such 
an impediment should not be automatically assumed solely on the basis of a diagnosis of 
DID. 
 3.1.2 Value (In)consistency, Appreciation, and Expressing a Choice  
 In some cases of DID, such as was illustrated in the hypothetical scenario just 
presented, there could be inconsistency among alter personalities' expressed values, 
which, in turn, would diminish their capacity for appreciation and expressing a decisional 
choice with regards to medical decision-making capacity.   
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 As discussed in Chapter One, each alter personality generally serves a specific 
function for an individual with DID. According to Braude, since alter personalities 
emerge from the pre-dissociative self, the functional "specialization" of alters results 
from the distribution of " . . . traits and abilities manifested by or latent in the pre-
dissociative [self] . . . throughout the members of the personality system."
216
 Therefore, 
since traits and abilities can be distributed among alter personalities, it would also make 
sense for a person's values to be divided among their alters. In order for an alter 
personality to be able to carry out its function or role, it would have to prioritize values 
that would be important or beneficial to their particular role. As an example, Oliver 
possesses the alter personalities "John" and "Sam." If John is a promiscuous alter and 
Sam is a protector alter, then in carrying out these roles, Sam would have to prioritize and 
value Oliver's personal safety and security, whereas John would be inclined to take risks. 
The competing values of personal security and risk-taking could both be plausibly 
possessed by Oliver as a whole, as persons without DID can possess contrasting values 
that are weighted depending on the situation or circumstances at hand. For instance, one 
might accept an invitation to go jet-skiing (an activity that carries a risk of bodily injury) 
but, on another occasion, prioritize their safety by declining to go skydiving since that 
activity is above the threshold of risk to which they are willing to consent. 
 However, in a person with DID, inconsistency between the expressed prioritized 
values of their alter personalities would be problematic, as one's alters could make vastly 
different choices regarding a particular medical treatment decision. While this may 
appear to be, on the surface, qualitatively similar to other patients who may struggle with 
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changing their minds repeatedly (such as those with other psychiatric disorders), the 
ramifications of clashing values between a patient's alter personalities could be quite 
detrimental. An example demonstrating this is the case of a twenty-three year old female 
with DID.
217
 She possesses two alter personalities, Sarah and Jamie, who frequently 
switch throughout the day.
218
 At one point, the individual in question was sexually 
assaulted while occupying the alter Sarah, and Sarah disappeared for six years.
219
 During 
this time, Jamie decided to begin a course of hormone therapy and this decision was 
implemented without any external intervention.
220
 Sarah returned to discover the physical 
changes that were occurring to her body, and she was bothered and distressed by these 
changes and that such a decision had been made in her absence.
221
 In this case, the patient 
(while occupying the alter personality Jamie) clearly lacked the ability to, as Maiese 
states,  " . . . [make] all-things considered judgments . . . in light of a conception of how a 
particular action [fit] into [their] life as a whole"
222
 (with the particular action here being 
decision-making). In this case, the patient is consciously aware of both of her alter 
personalities while occupying either Jamie or Sarah (although Sarah was absent or 
dormant during the decision). However, value incoherence among alter personalities can 
also be observed in patients with alters who display degrees of unawareness between 
them. For example, in the case of a twenty-year-old Korean patient (whose alters display 
asymmetrical awareness), the patients'  alters include (among others) a violent personality 
who is described by the system as a "thirsty killer," and a diametrically opposed alter who 
                                                             
217 Ribáry et al., "Multiplicity: An Explorative Interview," 4. 
218 Ibid., 4. 
219 Ibid., 4. 
220 Ibid., 4. 
221 Ibid., 4. 
222 Maiese, "Dissociative Identity Disorder," 772. 
  
49 
 
is nurturing, caring, and motherly.
223
 For those with asymmetrical awareness, depending 
on whether or not the alter making the decision is aware of the conscious states and 
thoughts of the other alters, the person as a whole may not be able to make medical 
decisions that are inclusive of the values and preferences of all of their personalities. In 
cases of total unawareness, such inclusive decision-making would be impossible due to 
the absence of conscious awareness among alters.         
 Therefore, in the context of capacity, value inconsistency may impede the 
patient's ability to foresee the implications of a particular treatment choice on their entire 
being, as it is possible that each alter would make treatment decisions according to only 
their values (as seen in the case of Jamie and Sarah). What the patient considers to be an 
acceptable or reasonable treatment while occupying one alter may not correlate with their 
wishes or opinions while occupying another alter. As well, in certain circumstances 
(especially involving patients with degrees of unawareness between alter personalities), a 
patient may have no way of knowing how they would react to a particular treatment 
option in their various personality states. Thus, in a patient with DID, an inability of 
individual alter personalities to appreciate the significance or impact of a treatment 
choice on the entire personality system would certainly diminish the patient's overall 
capacity to engage in sound medical decision-making.  
 Moreover, if a person's alter personalities can make contrasting treatment choices 
due to different prioritized values, their ability to effectively communicate or express 
such a choice would be hampered as well. As stated in Chapter One, if one is to 
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effectively communicate their preferred treatment option, their choice would have to 
remain stable long enough for it to be implemented or carried out by a physician or care 
team. Since a person's alter personalities can frequently switch between one another, the 
person's expressed choice could change multiple times if there is incongruence between 
the preferences for a particular treatment option among their alters. This parallels Lo's 
remarks from Chapter One regarding how the presence of inconsistent values would 
cause patients in general to repeatedly change their minds regarding their medical 
decisions.
224
 Since Lo states that such inconsistency would undermine a patient's ability 
to communicate a decisional choice,
225
 it can be inferred that this ability would also be 
impeded in individuals with DID who express incongruent values or preferences 
throughout their alter personalities. 
 However, note that in Chapter Two, I discussed Braude's notion of how an alter 
personality's abilities are not necessarily unique to that alter (as alters can share abilities). 
Similarly, it could be possible for alters to share values since some personalities' can have 
overlapping or shared functions.
226
 This is apparent in the aforementioned case of Kim 
Noble.
227
 Kim is a mother to daughter Aimee, and some of her alter personalities, such as 
"Bonny," "Hayley," and "Patricia," act in tandem as caregivers to Aimee.
228
 Kim (through 
these alters) successfully fought for custody of Aimee when the courts took her away at 
birth, thinking that Kim was psychologically unfit to care for a child.
229
 In Kim's case, 
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these personalities express her desire to be a parent and, as parental personalities, one 
could reasonably assume they would make decisions that serve to protect Aimee and 
ensure that Aimee's well-being is secured (what any good parent would highly value). 
Therefore, Kim's caregiving personalities would most likely agree on decisions and 
choices with regards to parenting due to these shared values, thereby suggesting that it 
would be theoretically possible, in other DID cases, for alter personalities to agree on 
certain types of decisions if their values coincide. Thus, in the context of capacity for 
medical decisions, depending on the treatment decision at hand, the ability for the person 
to express a singular decisional choice may not be so impeded. And if alters who share 
values are mutually aware of each other's thoughts and conscious states, then the person 
(as a whole) may be able to appreciate the significance of a particular treatment option on 
their system of alter personalities and choose an option that would be in line with their 
alters' common values. As will be elaborated upon in Chapter Four, physicians would 
need to determine this ability on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the degree of 
value sharing and conscious awareness among alter personalities, as well as the treatment 
decision being made. 
3.2 Understanding and Reasoning 
 In addition to appreciation and expressing a choice, the abilities of 
"understanding" and "reasoning" (as necessary for medical decision-making capacity) 
could be impeded in a person with DID. First, in cases where one's alter personalities are 
not consciously aware of each other's experiences, situational or contextual information 
needed to make a treatment decision may only reside with one personality. For example, 
hypothetically, Sally is a female patient with DID whose two alter personalities "Jane" 
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and "Lucy" exist in a state of two-way amnesia. She has been diagnosed with breast 
cancer and, during a consultation with her physician, "Jane" receives information 
regarding possible treatment options. Since Jane and Lucy cannot access one another's 
conscious thoughts and experiences, only Jane would be able to make an informed 
decision regarding the treatment since she possesses the knowledge about the treatment 
information. Thus, Sally's overall ability to understand and comprehend the necessary 
treatment information is diminished since Lucy does not possess this information. As 
well, an episode of dissociative amnesia (in the form of a lapse in dependable memory)
230
 
experienced by one alter could cause them to lose or forget information acquired during a 
previous manifestation. Using the same example, if Jane is unable to retain the treatment 
options and information presented to her and recall it at a later time, then she too would 
not possess the required information to make a decision regarding Sally's treatment, 
thereby impeding Sally's capacity requirement of understanding.  
 As previously mentioned, the concept of understanding with regards to medical 
decision-making capacity also requires a patient to comprehend that their decisions will 
have an impact on them.
 231
 This ability could be impeded in persons with DID. If one's 
alter personalities are mutually unaware of each other's existence, then it would follow 
that any treatment decision a single alter makes would be made in ignorance of any 
impact the decision will have on their other alters. In such a case, the person would be 
constricted to an awareness of the impact on the alter they are occupying when making 
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the decision, thereby impeding their ability to understand that a medical treatment 
decision could affect their entire well-being and welfare.          
 However, in cases of mutual conscious awareness between alter personalities, 
these  impediments to understanding may not be so severe, as more than one (or even the 
full range) of a person's alters could receive and retain the necessary knowledge or 
information to make a treatment decision. As well, if a person's alters are conscious of the 
existence and thoughts of each other, the person (as a whole) would be able to make a 
more informed treatment choice if they are aware that they would be impacted (possibly 
in drastically different ways) by a treatment choice in various personality states. Though 
it would not be guaranteed that such a patient would be able to make an informed 
decision while occupying every alter, it is theoretically possible; therefore, it should not 
be automatically assumed that an individual with DID is incapable of understanding and 
processing the required information for a medical decision.  
 Nevertheless, if a person with DID is not able to possess and comprehend the 
required treatment information for a specific decision in all of their personality states, it 
would seem logical that lacking such information would impede their overall ability to 
reason through the benefits and risks of various treatment options (depending on the alter 
personality they are occupying at the time of the decision). However, assessing the 
benefits and risks of treatment options would require more than just factual treatment 
information. Rovane states that rational agents are capable of ranking, and resolving 
inconsistencies among, their beliefs and values.
232
 It would make sense that to judge 
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whether or not a treatment would be beneficial, a patient would need to possess this 
ability. Recall Buchanan's and Brock's assertion that patients need a set of values or a 
conception of what is good to determine whether a treatment is beneficial or harmful to 
their well-being,
233
 and Lo's remarks regarding how coherency among a patient's values 
would allow a patient to assign importance or weight to certain values when making 
medical decisions.
234
 With regards to persons with DID, as previously shown, it is 
possible for alter personalities to possess competing values, and those values may not 
align in some circumstances. Therefore, in these cases, the person (as a whole) may not 
possess a consistent set of expressed values across their alter personality system. 
 Consequently, such a lack of consistency would impede a person with DID (as a 
whole) from being able to rationally reason through the benefits and risks of treatment 
options, as they may possess a different perception of whether or not a treatment would 
support their well-being depending on the alter personality manifested at the time of the 
decision. Moreover, it could also render an individual with DID incapable of providing 
consistent justification for why they would choose a particular treatment option over 
another or what makes a certain option better than another (clear indications that a patient 
is able to rationally reason through a treatment decision as outlined by Siegel et al.
235
). 
Therefore, it is possible that the requirement of reasoning for capacity could be 
diminished in some patients with DID. 
 In summary, while not every patient with DID would have their capacity for 
medical decisions impeded, it is possible that some patients will display a severe 
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diminishment of capacity. If medical decision-making capacity is somewhat specific 
depending on the particular patient, for what medical decisions should patients with DID 
have capacity? Are there decisions or situations where such patients lack capacity? How 
can physicians and care teams promote and preserve the autonomy of a patient with DID 
when possible? These questions will be explored in Chapter Four where I will present a 
patient-centered approach to determining what medical decisions could (and should) be 
made by DID patients.  
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Chapter 4: A Patient-Centered Approach for Determining Capacity 
 Thus far, I have demonstrated that a person with dissociative identity disorder 
(DID) is a singular person with one center of agency and alter personalities are vehicles 
which channel their autonomous agency that is rooted in their pre-dissociative self. I have 
also outlined how, regarding the requirements for medical decision-making capacity, this 
capacity, as well as the agency to make and be morally responsible for medical treatment 
decisions, may be impeded or diminished (but not necessarily) in patients with DID. I 
will now discuss my recommendation for a patient-centered approach in terms of 
determining which medical treatment decisions, and under which circumstances, patients 
with DID could (and could not) be ethically entitled to make for themselves. 
 Before this discussion, however, it is necessary to first highlight the reasons why I 
utilize the term "patient-centered." First, as I alluded to in the previous chapter, assessing 
medical decision-making capacity for this patient group is, to a degree, patient-specific. A 
DID patient's alter personalities can exhibit varying types of awareness between them, 
and the patient's values may or may not be shared among their alters due to the functional 
specificity of each alter. Therefore, depending on how these phenomena are manifested in 
a patient with DID, medical decision-making capacity may or may not be impeded, which 
would necessitate assessing such capacity on a somewhat individual basis. This would be 
consistent with the objectives of "patient-centered care," which " . . . [puts] the particular 
patient, not the average patient, at the center of care planning . . . " and requires health 
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care professionals to " . . . [have] the flexibility to respond differently to different 
patients."
236
   
 Moreover, the language of "patient-centered" implies that such an approach places 
utmost importance on the patient themselves. Indeed, patient-centered care emphasizes 
patient welfare, as well as respecting the patient's values, preferences, and beliefs.
237
 As 
previously discussed, allowing patients who are capable of making their own treatment 
decisions the freedom to do so respects the patient's autonomy, their decisional choices, 
and the values that guide those choices. Since patients with DID are autonomous agents 
(plausibly singular agents), and because capacity is both context- and decision-specific 
(as previously asserted by Pesiah et al.
238
), automatically discounting their autonomy by 
deeming them to not possess capacity for their medical decisions would constitute 
unethically undermining their free will. As well, this would undermine the patients' 
potential ability to make medical treatment choices that, in accordance with their beliefs 
and values, would be beneficial to them. Thus, in this sense, viewing DID patients and 
their welfare through a patient-centered lens would call on physicians and care teams to 
recognize situations where such patients could have capacity and uphold their autonomy. 
This would be in line with Lo's aforementioned remarks regarding the importance of 
health care professionals promoting the self-governance of patients with mental and 
cognitive disorders.
239
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 Although, considering the aforementioned points regarding the interrelatedness of 
capacity and autonomy
240
 and the reciprocal relationship between patient autonomy and 
intervention in treatment decisions,
241
 as well as Buchanan's and Brock's statements from 
Chapter One,
242
 promoting a DID patient's welfare would also require not allowing DID 
patients to make decisions they have been deemed incapable of making (due to 
significant impairment of capacity by the nature of their alter personalities) in order to 
prevent a possible infliction of harm upon them due to their incompetently made choices. 
As will be discussed in this chapter, a "patient-centered" approach that is based on 
promoting patient welfare provides leeway to ascertain a patient with DID as either 
capable or incapable of making a certain treatment decision, depending on the decision 
itself, as well as the degree of value sharing and conscious awareness among the patient's 
alter personalities. Such a way of viewing the decision-making capacity of DID patients 
would be coherent with current scholarly opinion on capacity and patients with mental 
disorders in general as I discussed in Chapter One.      
 It is important to clarify that the purpose of this chapter is not to generate every 
possible or hypothetical clinical decision and determine if a particular DID patient could 
have decision-making capacity for that decision, nor is it to provide determinations of 
capacity based on every possible configuration of awareness, value-sharing, or value-
incongruence between alter personalities. These tasks would be nearly impossible to 
successfully accomplish. Instead, my aim is to build on the discussion from Chapter 
Three and provide general guidance and suggestions regarding certain situations when it 
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might be ethically (and even legally) appropriate to deem such patients as capable or 
incapable of making a particular medical decision.  
4.1 Decision to Pursue or Refuse Integration as Psychotherapy 
 4.1.1 An Argument for Decision-Making Capacity 
 As stated in Chapter Two, integration is a therapy for DID which attempts to 
combine a person's alter personalities into one personality state. In my opinion, it is 
possible for all patients with DID (while occupying any of their alter personalities) to 
possess capacity to consent (or refuse) to undergo integration.  
 First, in cases of DID where the patient's alter personalities are mutually aware of 
each other's existence and conscious states, I argue that only the patient would be able to 
appreciate or comprehend the significance and importance of alter personalities to their 
being. While a psychiatrist or therapist would be able to understand the function or role 
of each alter to a patient with DID through observation,
243
 only the patient would be able 
to fully comprehend the (more subjective) significance or importance of each alter to 
their overall welfare and how they would react to, or be affected by, a disruption or 
change to their alter personality system (since they are the person that lives day-to-day as 
a collection of alters). Kluft states that certain patients are able to cope with possessing a 
collection of alter personalities and would prefer to live this way.
244
 For example, Nicky 
Robertson accepts his alters and likens them to "beads" that, together, make up the 
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"necklace" that is his whole identity.
245
  Other patients are not so accepting, such as one 
nurse who writes that having DID made her feel a multitude of negative emotions, such 
as "shame," "despair," and "panic."
246
 Integration and the loss of a patient's alters would 
certainly constitute a major change to the patient's personality system and way of life; 
therefore, it could be stated that a patient with mutually aware alters would possess the 
appreciation requirement of capacity, in that they would be able to appreciate the impact 
that integration would have on their entire being.  
 Considering Öztürk's and Şar's points from Chapter Two,247 the attitude of the 
patient's pre-dissociative self towards  integration would determine whether or not this 
impact is positive or negative, as it is the self that would have to accept (or reject) either a 
change in the nature of, or losing altogether, the alter personalities it initially created to 
block out the patient's traumatic memories and experiences. And since the attitude of this 
self to integrate would be channelled by the patient's alter personalities,
248
 each of the 
patient's alters would plausibly express the same viewpoint regarding whether or not to 
integrate. Thus, irrespective of the degree of awareness among a patient's alters, due to 
this cohesion, any DID patient (as a whole) could rationally reason through the benefits 
and risks of integration and, in turn, express a consistent choice of whether or not to 
integrate across their alter personality system (which would satisfy the medical decision-
making capacity requirements of reasoning and expressing a choice as stated in Chapter 
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One). For instance, if the pre-dissociative self is accepting of integration, the patient 
would regard the therapy as worth the risks of integration. Considering the concept and 
aims of integration,
249
 such risks could include losing alter personalities altogether, 
learning how to function and live as a single personality, and dealing with past trauma as 
the boundaries between the alter personalities and past memories and experiences erode 
(a feature of DID therapy
250
). On the contrary, if the pre-dissociative self is ambivalent 
towards integration, then the patient (through their alters) would view the disruptions to 
their personality system as detrimental to their welfare and not be willing to consent to 
the above risks. Therefore, in accordance with the medical decision-making capacity 
requirement of "understanding," the alter personalities of any DID patient would be able 
to understand that the decision to attempt integration is life-changing and would have an 
enormous impact on the patient's day-to-day life and welfare. Moreover, any uncertainty 
towards integration and reluctance to accept the aforementioned risks expressed by a 
patient's alter personalities is indicative of some uncertainty possessed by the pre-
dissociative self;
251
 thus, in order for consent to the therapy to be deemed acceptable, the 
patient's alters should display clear acceptance to integrate, as to disregard such 
uncertainty could constitute unethically undermining the wishes of the patient's 
autonomously capable pre-dissociative self.  
 Regarding the appreciation requirement of capacity, patients whose alters are not 
consciously aware of one another or patients who possess incoherency among their alters' 
awareness of other alters (asymmetrical amnesia) would not necessarily have the ability 
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to appreciate the significance of the decision to integrate on their whole being when 
making the decision, since they would be only occupying one alter at the time of the 
decision. Despite this, given the aforementioned commentary on how a patient's alter 
personalities reflect the attitude of their pre-dissociative or trauma-self towards 
therapy,
252
 the choice to integrate would plausibly be consistent across a patient's alter 
personalities. As a result, this inability may not impede such a patient's capacity for this 
decision. Moreover, considering that the decision to integrate (or not) affects the 
fundamental psychological composition and welfare of all patients with DID, in my 
opinion, one would be ethically justified in respecting the autonomous agency of the pre-
dissociative self and, in turn, accepting the choice regarding integration expressed by any 
DID patient as one that is capably made. Since many DID patients have experienced 
extreme abuse and are psychologically traumatized, physicians need to exercise care in 
ensuring that they " . . . avoid inflicting further pain . . .." upon the patient;
253
 therefore, 
respecting a patient's capacity and autonomy for this decision would certainly promote 
the patient's welfare. 
 On a somewhat simpler note, it could also be argued that because integration is 
regarded as an autonomously executed behaviour by the patient, forcing integration upon 
a patient through forced therapy would be therapeutically ineffective. Forced integration 
via hypnosis and verbally persuading the patients' alters to integrate while the patient is in 
a hypnotic trance has been attempted by psychiatrists, notably Brandsma and Ludwig.
254
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However, many clinicians believe such techniques to be ineffective, as forcing integration 
results in the creation of a highly unstable integrated personality or a failure to integrate 
altogether.
255
 Therefore, in order to achieve the therapeutic goals of integration, the 
decision to integrate should lie with the patient themselves. Furthermore, attempting to 
force integration therapy upon a patient would be highly unethical for two reasons. First, 
not allowing the patient to make this decision for themselves by attempting to coercively 
initiate integration while the patient in a suggestible state (i.e. hypnosis) would 
undermine the autonomous capability of the pre-dissociative self to choose whether or 
not to integrate, as well as the demonstrated sufficient decision-making capacity of the 
person as a whole regarding this decision. Second, given that patients with DID are often 
psychologically troubled individuals, a psychiatrist or care team may " . . . intensify the 
strife that they are supposed to stifle" if they attempt to impose integration upon a patient, 
as the patient may be re-traumatized if they feel that their welfare and alter personalities 
are threatened and not respected by their health care professionals.
256
 Recall Lo's 
aforementioned point regarding the need for health care providers to establish trust with 
vulnerable patients, including those with mental disorders, as well as foster comfort 
through reassuring such patients that their needs will be met.
257
 Both of these attributes of 
ethically sound care of mental health patients would certainly be undermined through 
imposing a patient to attempt integration, and, as Putnam states, "[t]here may be a 
significant disruption in the therapeutic alliance following a forced [integration]."
258
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4.1.2 Potential Illegality of Involuntary Psychiatric Detainment for DID Patients 
 A final consideration is the potential illegality of detaining a patient with DID as 
an involuntary patient in a psychiatric unit. Spring notes that, among persons with DID in 
the United Kingdom, there is concern regarding the clauses in the UK Mental Health Act 
which give law enforcement personnel the grounds to move an individual to a "place of 
safety" if they "reasonably think" that the individual is "mentally ill" and moving them 
will " . . . keep [them] and other people safe."
259
 Most often, this involves detainment  for 
psychiatric assessment and possible further detainment in a hospital as an involuntary 
patient.
260
 Such concern would lead one to examine whether an individual with DID 
could be legally detained due to their condition, and I argue that this could be legally 
problematic under mental health legislation in Newfoundland and Labrador (NL). I have 
chosen to utilize this legislation as a framework for analysis, as the legislation in NL is 
fairly standard and comparable to legislation in other developed nations. Also, as a bona 
fide resident of NL, I am interested in how our legislation would impact DID patients in 
this province. 
 Under Section 17(b)(ii) of the Newfoundland and Labrador Mental Health Care 
and Treatment Act, two of the criteria that must be met for a patient with a mental 
disorder in this province to be involuntarily admitted into a psychiatric unit are as 
follows: 
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 1. [They] [are] likely to cause harm to [themselves] or to  
 others or to suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration  
 or serious physical impairment if [they] [are] not admitted to  
 and detained in a psychiatric unit as an involuntary patient. 
 
 2. [They] [are] unable to fully appreciate the nature and  
 consequences of the mental disorder or to make an informed  
 decision regarding [their] need for treatment or care and  
 supervision . . ..
 261
 
   
Considering the first stipulation of the second clause regarding appreciation of the mental 
disorder in question, patients whose alters are consciously aware of each other would be 
able to acknowledge they have DID and that they house a collection of alters because of 
this disorder;
262
 however, this may not be the case for patients whose alters are unaware 
of each other's existence. Each alter would only recognize their own existence and, as a 
result, the patient (while occupying any of their alters) may not consider themselves as 
having DID and other personality states. An example of this is the historical case of 
Norma, whose alter personalities were unable to integrate because they did not recognize 
the existence of each other nor believed they existed.
263
 Therefore, for patients whose 
alters display asymmetrical awareness or are unaware of each other's existence, 
depending on the alter they are occupying at any given moment, the patient may not be 
able to understand the nature of the disorder and, in such cases, this clause may hold up.  
 In the previous section, I established that the decision to pursue integration 
therapy is one that could be capably made by all patients with DID. Regarding the first 
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clause of Section 17(b)(ii), patients with DID who decide not to pursue integration 
therapy for DID would not necessarily be harming themselves. The notion of "harm" is 
both broad and vague in terms of its meaning, and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to 
outline and defend a conception of harm; however, if one accepts, for instance, Feinberg's 
well-known philosophical viewpoint (i.e. to cause harm is to setback one's or another's 
interests),
264
 a patient who decides not to integrate would not be harming themselves as 
this decision would support the attitude to not pursue integration that is possessed by 
their autonomously capable pre-dissociative self. Considering harm in the psychological 
sense, as previously stated, choosing not to integrate would promote the psychological 
and emotional welfare of the patient if the pre-dissociative self is not ready to do so; 
therefore, such a decision would not harm the patient in this sense, and, by extension, not 
cause "mental deterioration" as their mental stability would be maintained. Involuntary 
detainment would inflict undue psychological harm due to the potential distress and 
anxiety this act would induce in the patient.
265
 Moreover, DID does not necessarily cause 
physical harm, deterioration, or impairment, as patients with DID can function day-to-day 
and carry out successful lives.
266
 Detainment on the basis of harm may be legally 
justifiable, though, on a case-by-case basis when factoring in a particular patient's life 
circumstances and if they are causing significant harm to others. Nevertheless, solely 
choosing to live with DID would not be grounds for psychiatric detainment under the 
                                                             
264 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol. 1 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984), 
31-32. 
265 Putnam, Diagnosis and Treatment, 304. 
266 For an example of this, see Kim Noble's story about becoming a successful painter and artist: Kim 
Noble, "About," http://www.kimnobleartist.com/about.html.  
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aforementioned first clause, and any attempt to do so would be both unethical and illegal 
under this legislation. 
4.2 Non-Psychotherapeutic Treatment Decisions 
 Similar to all other patient groups, patients with DID can be afflicted with non-
psychiatric pathologies and many will likely encounter medical treatment decisions other 
than choosing whether or not to integrate their alter personalities. Recall that a patient-
centered approach prioritizes seeking out possible means of deeming patients with DID 
as capable of making their own treatment decisions, so this section will outline possible 
ways that such patients could possess decision-making capacity for non-
psychotherapeutic treatment decisions.   
 4.2.1 Possessing a Main Alter Personality   
 Physicians and care teams should determine if the patient possesses a "main"
267
 or 
"host"
268
 alter personality. Many individuals with DID possess a dominant personality 
that is manifested most often and takes on a larger functional role than their other 
alters.
269
 Putnam notes that in many cases, the host personality is often "compulsively 
good" and "conscience-stricken,"
270
 with an example being a fifty-five year-old patient 
who states that she feels most comfortable and at ease when occupying her main alter 
(who also identifies as a fifty-five year old female).
271
 It is not clear from the literature 
whether the patient chooses their main alter personality or whether it just emerges as the 
                                                             
267 Victor S. Alpher, "Assessment of Ego Functioning in Multiple Personality Disorder," Journal of 
Personality Assessment 56, no. 3 (1991), 375. 
268 Putnam, Diagnosis and Treatment, 107. 
269 Ibid., 107.  
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271 Muhammad Awais Rehan et al., "A Strange Case of Dissociative Identity Disorder: Are There Any 
Triggers?," Cureus 10, no. 7 (2018): e2957, 2.  
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more dominant alter. However, because dissociation is considered an adaptive response 
and patients have some control over the dissociative process to ensure they are able to 
cope in their surroundings,
272
 I think it is reasonable to posit that an alter could be chosen 
or designated as a main alter as part of ensuring that the patient's specific coping and 
survival needs are met. Main alter personalities can assume a variety of different forms. 
For example, "Matthew" is the dominant alter in a system containing alters who have 
names of fictional characters (e.g. Han Solo; Luke Skywalker), and the alters refer to 
themselves as the "space system";
273
 "Autumn" refers to herself as the "core" functional 
personality of her system, and the other alters are mainly child personalities who call 
Autumn "mommy";
274
 "Nadine" is considered the "major" alter of the personality system 
to which she belongs and she speaks on behalf of the other alters.
275
  
 With regards to medical decision-making, consider first the above case of 
Autumn. Hypothetically, the person who houses Autumn and the other alters is 
confronted with a medical decision concerning whether or not to undergo high-risk brain 
surgery. Since child alters think and act like children regardless of the age of the 
individual who houses them,
276
 a physician would be justified in deeming Autumn to 
have decision-making authority since standard ethical and legal medical practice regards 
                                                             
272 See Sarbin, "On the Belief"; Spanos, "Multiple Identity Enactments." 
273 Ribáry, "Multiplicity: An Explorative Interview Study," 4.  
274 Monica Robins, "Pieces of Me: One Woman's Story of Living with Multiple Identities,"WKYC3 News, 
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275 René J. Muller, "A Patient with Dissociative Identity Disorder 'Switches' in the Emergency Room," 
Psychiatric Times 15, no. 11 (1998). Retrieved from https://www.psychiatrictimes.com/dissociative-
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Life with Dissociation," in Living with the Reality of Dissociative Identity Disorder: Campaigning Voices 
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children as having limited autonomous capability of giving consent to their own medical 
treatment.
277
 In this case, it would be ethically sound to accept the decision made by the 
main alter Autumn, provided the patient is deemed to possess the aforementioned 
requirements for medical decision-making capacity while occupying Autumn. If so, this 
person's physician could assert that decisions made by Autumn are to be regarded as 
authoritative and note on the person's health record that only decisions made by Autumn 
are to be accepted and carried out.  
 However, what would be an appropriate approach in cases like Matthew or 
Nadine above (i.e. the patient's main and other alters are aware of one another but the 
alters are all adult personalities)? In my opinion, it is not unreasonable to posit that such a 
patient (while occupying their less predominant alters) might accept a treatment choice 
that they knowingly made while occupying their main alter. The patient would have to 
endure and live with the consequences of the decision for the longest period of time while 
occupying their main alter; therefore, it seems ethically plausible to accept a decision 
made by the patient during the manifestation of the main alter, as it is during this 
manifestation that the patient's overall welfare would be most at stake.  One could argue 
that affording decision-making authority to the main alter personality would resemble 
cultures where men are regarded as authoritative and make decisions for their wives, thus 
undermining the autonomous capability of their wives to make their own decisions. 
However, a key difference between these situations is that, in the case of the man and 
wife, one agent (i.e. the man) is making decisions for another agent (i.e. his wife); in the 
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case of a patient with DID, there is only one agent involved (this singularity was 
established in Chapter Two). As previously mentioned, given the "adaptive function" of 
alter formation,
278
 it is plausible that the patient's pre-dissociative self (as the singular 
locus of agency) can choose which alter becomes the main alter and, as apparent from the 
discussion in Chapter Two, channel the patient's agency through the main alter. 
Therefore, from a viewpoint of autonomy, accepting the decision of the main alter would 
constitute respecting the autonomous agency of the patient to make decisions they believe 
would contribute to their welfare. Although, ethically, a physician would have to 
determine whether or not the patient possesses the aforementioned requirements for 
decision- making capacity while occupying their main alter before accepting decisions; 
however, if a patient has a self-recognized main alter personality, the patient's decision 
made through this alter should be accepted if at all possible. 
 4.2.2 Value-Sharing Among Alter Personalities 
 In Chapter Three, I discussed how shared values between a patient's alter 
personalities can result in an increased overall capacity to appreciate the implications of a 
treatment decision on the patient's entire being, as well as greater consistency among their 
alters' expressed choice of treatment and assessment of the benefits and risks of various 
treatment options. This indicates that the level of value-sharing among alter personalities 
can significantly affect determinations of decision-making capacity for treatment 
decisions. As a result, an intriguing question is raised: what degree of value-overlap 
would be necessary to possess capacity for a treatment decision? 
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  Beauchamp and Childress state that risk and the " . . . evidence for determining 
[capacity] . . ." are positively correlated.
279
 In other words, as the risks associated with a 
medical decision increase/decrease, the required evidence for determining capacity with 
regards to that decision should increase/decrease as well.
280
 For example, they assert that 
the attributes required to consent to participating in medical research should be more 
stringent than objecting to participation.
281
 This would make sense, as participating in 
research carries a greater level of risk and potential for harm to the patient than not 
participating; therefore, the requirements for patient capacity to choose participation 
would need to be greater than choosing not to participate in order to ensure that such a 
decision is informed. Since value-sharing among alter personalities would be an integral 
component or attribute of determining medical decision-making capacity for patients with 
DID, it is plausible to apply Beauchamp's and Childress's assertion to this patient group 
and state that the degree of value-overlap needed for a treatment decision would depend 
on the degree of risk posed by the decision. As such, decisions with a lower/higher level 
of risk and potential for harm would require a lower/higher degree of value-sharing 
between a patient's alters; thus, I would argue that patients with DID could be capable, in 
some cases, of making both low-risk and high-risk treatment decisions because, as 
previously discussed through overlapping and shared functions of alter personalities,
282
 a 
patient's alters can share values. 
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 Hypothetically, consider the following treatment decisions which vary widely in 
terms of the amount of associated risk: deciding to obtain a bandage for a minor burn, and 
deciding whether or not to undergo a leg amputation for a severe infection. It is clear that 
deciding to amputate carries much greater risks (e.g. physical rehabilitation with an 
artificial limb; long recovery time). However, this decision is also much more value-
laden, as bandaging is a common treatment (even outside of a hospital setting) that most 
patients would probably accept, whereas amputation could significantly affect all aspects 
of one's life and, as a result, it is highly personal choice, and one may or may not be 
willing to accept the risks associated with amputation based on their values. For example, 
if one wants to eventually pursue an active lifestyle, then having the amputation and 
artificial limb insertion could relieve their pain from the infection and allow them to do 
so; therefore, the risks of the surgery would not outweigh the benefit of a lifestyle 
improvement. However, if a patient does not want to be an in-patient or push themselves 
through the rehabilitation required by surgery, these risks would probably not be 
acceptable to the patient.     
 Suppose that Patient A is presented with the bandage decision and Patient B is 
presented with the amputation decision. Both patients are adults with DID and, in each 
case, their alter personalities are adult personalities who are consciously aware of one 
another's existence and thoughts (but there is no main alter). Considering Patient A, their 
decision is low-risk and could plausibly be made with a low level of value coherence. 
Therefore, provided that the knowledge regarding the burn as well as the need for a 
bandage is shared among their alters, any of Patient A's alters could make this decision, 
regardless of the level of value-sharing. Regarding Patient B, the level of value-sharing 
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would need to be greater due to the higher level of risk associated with the outcomes. As 
mentioned in Chapter Three, a patient may judge the risks of a decision differently in 
their various alter personality states due to the values possessed by those alters, so value-
sharing would be necessary to ensure that the decision would support the overall welfare 
of the patient.  
 In this case, if Patient B is aware that all of their alters uphold the same values, 
any alter would be able to soundly consent to the decision. For example, if all of the 
patient's alters possess the value of gaining an active lifestyle, the patient (while 
occupying any alter) could consent to the amputation, as they would be aware that this 
decision is in line with their alters' shared value and would be able to appreciate that this 
choice would have a positive impact on them in all of their personality states. Moreover, 
the patient (as a whole) would express a consistent choice across their range of alter 
personalities, and would be able to rationally reason through the decision in the same 
manner across their personality states, all of which are crucial components of medical 
decision-making capacity. To clarify, I am not invoking or arguing for a standard here, 
nor am I insisting that this is the sole means by which capacity should be ascertained. 
Instead, I am only arguing that if a clinical situation similar to that of the above scenario 
arises, this DID patient should be deemed to have capacity for the medical treatment 
decision at hand.   
 However, in general, medical treatment decisions do not always align with all of a 
patient's values, as such decisions often require weighting certain values as more 
important than others and preserving the values and preferences that are deemed to be 
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important.
283
 Therefore, it may not be guaranteed that Patient B would choose the 
amputation option while occupying all of their alter personality states  due to the differing 
roles of their alters and possible differing values expressed by those roles.
284
 In this case, 
since Patient B (a singular agent) is consciously aware of how they would react to the 
decision in each personality state, they could theoretically opt to weight the value of an 
active lifestyle if they judge this value as important to their welfare. Therefore, if this is 
the case, Patient B (and other similar patients) could again soundly choose amputation, 
as, effectively, they would be able to judge which value(s) are important to them and 
choose the option according what they deem would be in line with their weighted 
value(s). Possessing these abilities would indicate that Patient B (as a whole) would have 
the capacity to logically reason through the risks (and benefits) of the decision and 
provide clear rational justification for why they would choose amputation, both of which 
would be integral components for capacity for this decision. It should be noted that the 
number of alter personalities a patient possesses does not factor into my arguments 
above, as patients whose alters are aware of one another would still possess this 
awareness and ability to weight values because of this awareness regardless of the size of 
their personality system.   
 Possessing shared values and such weighting becomes important when patients 
whose alter personalities are not consciously aware of each other or display degrees of 
asymmetrical awareness are faced with higher-risk treatment decisions. It is worth 
explaining, first, that if there is an externally-observed main alter, it would be ethically 
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questionable to afford authority to the values or preferences of that specific alter, as the 
patient would probably not accept treatment decisions made by a personality state they do 
not know exists except for when they are occupying that sole state. Parallels have been 
noted in the case literature on DID and legal culpability, as a person's alter personalities 
who are unaware that another alter committed a crime do not acknowledge or accept that   
this action occurred.
285
 In such cases of DID, I think that deeming this alter as 
authoritative would constitute arbitrarily prioritizing one of the patient's values (or one set 
of values) over another, as to the patient, there would be no self-recognized main alter 
personality. Thus, if a physician or health care team presented a treatment decision made 
by such a personality to the patient's other alters, the patient would probably be confused 
as they would have no recollection of making this choice (caused by "selective amnesia" 
for this decision),
286
 and it may cause distress to the patient if they think their health care 
team is paternalistically imposing a choice on them. Moreover, such patients would not 
be able to self-judge the values or preferences of their range of alters, so it would not be 
possible for them to knowingly make a treatment decision in light of any shared values 
among their alters or in consideration of how their alters would react to the decision.  
 Even though such patients may not be able to ascertain the values and opinions of 
their range of alters, it would be possible for health care professionals to do so, and, in 
some cases, high-risk treatment choices could still be made in accordance with the shared 
or common values of a patient's alters. Hypothetically, if Patient C (whose alters are not 
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aware of each other's existence) is faced with the above amputation decision, the health 
care team could present the decision separately to each of Patient C's alters and the 
patient could be allowed to make the decision while occupying each alter according to the 
values expressed by that alter. If there is significant overlap in terms of the decision and 
the values which shape that decision between Patient C's alters, then, similar to Patient 
B's case, these predominant values could be weighted and the decision could be accepted 
as it would be in line with the weighted values. Therefore, in accordance with Buchanan's 
and Brock's aforementioned arguments,
287
 even though the patient themselves did not 
actively make or reason through the decision it would still be ethically sound, as the 
patient's autonomous agency is afforded respect because their weighted values and 
preferences are dictating the decisional choice and the rationale behind it. However, the 
patient's alters would have to remember the information regarding the treatment between 
manifestations (as such a high-risk decision would probably take time and have to be 
decided over more than one manifestation of each alter), and it would probably only be 
practical to do this in cases where there is a small number of alters. Nevertheless, this act 
would be possible for some cases, so in accordance with a patient-centered approach 
(which prioritizes DID patients' autonomy), physicians and care teams should attempt this 
if at all possible.  
4.3 Possible Situations Where DID Patients May Not Possess Capacity 
 As part of the patient-centered approach, in some cases, it may be ethical to deem 
DID patients as not capable of making their own treatment choices if the patient is unable 
to sufficiently meet the requirements of medical decision-making capacity. Here, I 
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propose two situations where this could be possible for non-integration treatment 
decisions.  
 In the previous section, I discussed a scenario where significant value-sharing 
would be a crucial indicator of decisional capacity and could enable patients with DID to 
make both low- and high-risk treatment choices. However, as outlined in Chapter One, 
the diversity or incoherency in the roles of the manifested alter personalities indicates the 
severity of the patient's condition.
288
 Since the roles or functions of the manifested alters 
would be plausible indicators of the values possessed by those alters (as discussed in 
Chapter Three), incoherency among the patient's expressed values would ipso facto 
indicate a more severe condition. Thus, consistent with the rationale employed in the 
previous section, I argue that in instances where there is total or highly significant value-
incongruence between a patient's alters, the severity of the patient's condition could result 
in a severe enough diminishment of medical decision-making capacity to preclude them 
from making treatment decisions if this incongruence leads to complete and irresolvable 
disagreement of choice. This could especially occur with patients whose alters are not 
aware of one another's existence (either a large or small personality system), as such 
patients would have no way of resolving disagreement or discord among their alters' 
opinions and values due to such lack of awareness. In these cases, all of the 
aforementioned capacity requirements (appreciation, understanding, reasoning, and 
expressing a choice) could be sufficiently impeded to preclude capacity. First, regarding 
appreciation, the patient (as a whole) would not be able to ascertain the implications of a 
particular treatment choice on their entire being at the time of the decision, as they would 
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only be able to determine the implications for the alter making the decision. As a result, 
they would not be able to understand that there are other alters who could be affected by 
the decision. Moreover, due to total value-incongruence, the patient would likely arrive at 
different decisional choices due to contrasting assessments and reasoning of the benefits 
and risks of various treatment options, and it would not be guaranteed that a significant 
majority of those decisional choices would be the same. Thus, there is a high probability 
that the choices expressed by the patient (across their range of alter personalities) would 
be incoherent. Taking into account the aforementioned current opinion on justifiable 
intervention in patients' medical decision-making,
289
 since the core attributes of medical 
decision-making capacity would be severely impeded in these circumstances, such 
patients could reasonably be precluded from possessing capacity.  
 Furthermore, patients who possess a significantly small number of alter 
personalities, such as two, who are mutually aware of each other's conscious states but 
express conflicting choices due to value-incoherence, would not be able to make sound 
treatment decisions. Recall the case of Sarah and Jamie as discussed in Chapter Three. 
This case demonstrates that, with such a low number of alters, implementing a decision 
that goes against just one alter's wishes would be unethical, as it would cause the patient 
distress and anxiety due to the fact that they would be occupying each of their alters more 
frequently than if they possessed a larger number of rotating alters. In a case such as this 
one, if a patient is not able make a decision they would accept in both personality states, 
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no alter's wishes or preferences should be prioritized and deemed authoritative, and they 
should be precluded from making their own medical treatment decisions. 
 In the above situations, these particular DID patients would require a substitute 
decision-maker (SDM) due to their incapacity. If a patient who belongs to one of the 
above groups is a Newfoundland and Labrador resident, this would entail following the 
legislation outlined in Section 10 of the Advanced Health Care Directives Act (AHCD 
Act) to determine an appropriate SDM.
290
 However, SDMs for such patients would be 
faced with a peculiar problem. Ethically, a SDM should, according to Beauchamp and 
Childress, make decisions in line with the patient's expressed values and  " . . . determine 
the highest probable net benefit among the available [treatment] options, assigning 
different weights to interests the patient has in each option balanced against their inherent 
risks, burdens, or costs."
291
 It would be difficult to assign weight to certain preferences or 
interests (based on what the patient would value most if they had capacity) if the patient 
expresses highly contrasting and conflicting values in each personality state. In other 
words, a SDM may not be able to determine what the patient (as a singular whole) would 
value most and what option would be most in line with this value if there is significant 
value-incongruence between alter personalities. Therefore, how could treatment decisions 
be made in these circumstances? 
 With regards to SDMs and patients in Newfoundland and Labrador, Section 
12(1)(c) of the AHCD Act states that in cases where a SDM does not possess knowledge 
of the patient's preferences or wishes for a particular decision, they are required to act in 
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accordance with what they " . . . reasonably [believe] to be in the best interests of the 
[patient]."
292
 This clause could apply to a SDM for a DID patient in either of the 
aforementioned groups, since the patient's treatment preference and the value(s) that 
shape their preference would essentially be indeterminable. However, without knowledge 
of what the patient values most (or would value most if they possessed capacity), in these 
cases, what could a SDM utilize to make a best interest judgement? Contextual and 
situational factors  regarding the patient's life may indicate potential important interests 
that the patient could possess, which in turn could help guide a SDM's decisional choices.  
 For example, hypothetically, "Linda" is a female DID patient and switches 
frequently between the alter personalities "Ruby" and "Debbie," who are not aware of 
each other's existence. Linda is a mother to an infant, and while Debbie acts as the 
caregiver and provider for the child, Ruby wants to live a carefree lifestyle and expresses 
that she not ready to be a mother. Linda (as Debbie) has also begun breastfeeding her 
child, yet she is faced with a medical decision regarding two equally effective drugs, one 
of which poses a much higher risk of toxicity to her infant if ingested though breast milk. 
Linda's physician first discusses the decision with both Ruby and Debbie in an attempt to 
explore their viewpoints on the decision. However, due to the highly conflicting attitudes 
between Debbie and Ruby toward parenthood, the physician is not convinced that Linda 
(as a whole) fully understands that this decision will greatly impact her infant and 
appreciates the significance of this decision on both her infant and the caregiver 
personality Debbie. As a result, Linda is deemed to not possess capacity for this decision 
and a SDM is appointed. In this case, even though Ruby does not appear to value being a 
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parent, Linda does possess this value as it is clearly demonstrated through Debbie. As a 
parent, it is quite plausible that Linda (as Debbie) would have a significant interest in 
protecting the health and well-being of her child, and most reasonable people would 
probably agree that the safety and security of one's child is of utmost importance. 
Therefore, it would be ethically appropriate for the SDM to weight Linda's interest in 
protecting her child and choose the lower-risk drug, as this decision reduces the risks to 
the child and accedes to Linda's parental interest. Such weighting of patient's interests and 
associated risks of various options upholds both the AHCD Act and Beauchamp's and 
Childress's assertions regarding the ethical responsibility of SDMs.          
 It is clear that determining whether a patient with DID possesses decision-making 
capacity for a treatment decision necessitates taking into account the following factors: 
the particular decision at hand, the level of risk associated with the decision, the amount 
of value-sharing among the patient's alter personalities, and the degree and type of 
awareness that exists between the patient's alters. As I have demonstrated in this chapter, 
there are many possible clinical situations and treatment decisions where patients with 
DID could (and, with regards to integration, should) ethically possess capacity; however, 
there are circumstances where it would be highly questionable to deem such patients as 
decisionally capable, especially when assessing patients with severe value-incongruence 
and conflict between their alter personalities. Therefore, assessment would need to be 
done on a case-by-case basis, and physicians and care teams could consider the points 
and arguments I have presented in this chapter as a solid starting place.  
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Conclusion 
 Considering this thesis as a whole, I have demonstrated that medical decision-
making capacity determination for patients with DID is a complex, multi-layered task; 
however, to do so in a ethical, patient-centered manner (i.e. one that is in line with current 
thought on the treatment of vulnerable patients) would require approaching this issue 
from a position where patient autonomy and self-governance over medical decision-
making is afforded if at all possible. As previously stated, it is imperative that vulnerable 
patients (including those with DID) know that their health care professionals have their 
welfare and wishes at heart, and to demonstrate this would require not automatically 
deeming them incapable of their own treatment decisions. With regards to DID patients 
and medical decision-making capacity specifically, it is my hope that this thesis will shed 
some light on this important issue and introduce arguments and suggestions that will 
generate further exploration, analysis, and discussion in order to continue advancing the 
ethical care and treatment of this unique patient population. 
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